Saturday 3rd of January 2026
Home » Blogs » Gus Leonisky's blog

not so fast, buster....

US President Donald Trump has warned Iran's authorities against killing peaceful protesters, saying Washington "will come to their rescue".

In a brief post on social media, he wrote: "We are locked and loaded and ready to go," but gave no further details.

A senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded by saying Trump should "be careful" if he intervened, warning of potential chaos across the Middle East.

At least eight people are reported to have been killed in Iran after almost a week of mass protests sparked by worsening economic conditions.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q4z33pnnyo

 

==================

 

Western media, especially those outlets firmly aligned with the neoconservative view, are quick to jump on reports of protests in Iran as a sign that the Islamic Republic of Iran is about to implode. Events today in Iran provided another spurt of arousal among neocons longing to bring back the Shah and eliminate the mullahs. Here’s a summary of the various news reports:

On December 30, 2025, protests in Iran entered their third day, spreading from initial economic grievances in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar to universities and multiple cities across the country. Triggered by the Iranian rial plunging to record lows (around 1.38–1.42 million to the USD) and inflation hitting 42.2–42.5%, demonstrations began with shopkeepers and merchants striking and closing businesses, evolving into broader anti-government chants.

Protests expanded beyond Tehran to cities including Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Hamadan, Karaj, Qeshm, Malard, Kermanshah, and Yazd. University students joined on Tuesday, chanting slogans like “Death to the dictator” (referring to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), calls for freedom, and pro-monarchy references (e.g., “Long live the Shah” or “Rest in peace Reza Shah”).

President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged “legitimate demands,” instructed the interior ministry to dialogue with protest representatives, and pledged economic reforms. The central bank governor resigned, replaced by Abdolnasser Hemmati. Officials offered talks but warned against escalation or foreign exploitation.

Hmmm… What’s really going on? Turns out that Nima Alkorshid, the host of Dialogue Works, is on an extended family vacation in Tehran. It has been 12 years since he was last in Iran. I know one thing for certain… His mom is thrilled to have her son, his wife and her grandchildren in Tehran. Anyway, I called Nima and asked him what he was seeing.

According to Nima, there is frustration with the government, i.e., Pezeshkian, over the high inflation and that is one impetus driving the protests. However, it is not directed at the Islamic regime despite Western press reports claiming otherwise. Nima also pointed out that about 25% of the population is quite conservatie (these are the folks who supported Ahmadinejad) and they are angry with Pezeshkian because he is viewed as too accommodating of the West. These folks, while miffed at the government, are staunch supporters of the Ayatollah Khameni.

There is video evidence corroborating Nima’s observations. In one clip an Iranian student protester explains the reasoning behind the demonstrations, stating that they are not opposed to the Islamic Republic, but rather to corruption among government officials who are worsening the economic crisis. He says:

This is the voice of an Iranian Basiji. I would sacrifice myself for this homeland. I would give my life for the Islamic Republic. Our protest is against people like Ali Ansari and other corrupt officials. Mr. Ejei [Chief of the Judiciary], where are you?

I was pleasantly surprised by Pezeshkian’s reaction to the protests… Instead of beating the hell out of the protestors and tossing them into prison, he acknowledged the legitimacy of their complaints and fired the central bank governor while promising economic reforms. Seems like a pretty reasonable response to me.

I believe that Russia and China — who have denounced and rejected Europe’s attempt to reimpose economic sanctions on Iran — are working on measures to boost the Iranian economy and get inflation under control. While there is no denying that Iran’s economy has been badly damaged because of Western sanctions — which both Russia and China supported in 2015 as part of the JCPOA — Iran, by virtue of is membership in BRICS and closer economic, political and military ties with Russia and China, is in a stronger position now to revive the economy.

Russia’s economic support focuses on strategic partnerships and trade, and is often intertwined with military cooperation. In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, including provisions for economic cooperation. Russia also is providing advanced conventional weapons (e.g., fighter aircraft, attack helicopters) in exchange for Iranian drones, missiles, and ammunition, indirectly bolstering Iran’s economy through barter-like military trade.

Along with the economic cooperation, there have been five visits by four senior Iranian officials to Moscow since July 1, 2025, based on reported trips. These include political, military, and economic figures, with purposes ranging from nuclear discussions to military cooperation and strategic partnerships:

Ali Larijani (Supreme Leader Adviser, political) – July 20, 2025: Discussed nuclear negotiations and bilateral relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh (Defense Minister, military) – July 21, 2025: Met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to expand military cooperation, likely seeking assistance post-Israel-Iran conflict.

Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Minister, political) – August 2025: Sought Russian support in the aftermath of U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iranian infrastructure following the ceasefire announcement. He made a second visit on December 17, 2025, to sign a foreign ministry cooperation plan for 2026-2028 and hail expanding partnerships.

Mohammad Reza Aref (First Vice President, political/economic) – November 17-18, 2025: Attended the SCO Council of Heads of Government meeting and held bilateral talks with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on economic and political cooperation.

But that is not all… there is the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). There have been multiple bilateral and multilateral meetings/discussions between Russia and Iran (often including Azerbaijan) since July 1, 2025, focused on advancing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal trade route linking Russia, Iran, India, and beyond. Here are the key meetings in 2025:

October 2025: Trilateral talks in Baku (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran) on expanding the western route of the INSTC, including infrastructure inspections and agreements on logistics/cross-border efficiency.

November 2025: Railway executives from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum in Baku to enhance the western route’s competitiveness (e.g., fixed pricing, unified rates).

December 12, 2025: Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian discussed INSTC progress (including the Rasht-Astara railway) during a meeting in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

December 16, 2025: High-level talks in Tehran between Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister for Transport Vitaly Savelyev, emphasizing fast-tracking the corridor and removing obstacles.

And then there is China. China offers more substantial economic lifelines, mainly through oil trade and pledged investments, positioning itself as Iran’s largest trading partner. China purchases 90% (or nearly all) of Iran’s exported oil at discounted prices (as low as $14 per barrel below market), providing crucial revenue—estimated at $67 billion for the Iranian year ending March 2025 (15% of GDP). This accounts for 13.6% of China’s oil imports and funds 45% of Iran’s 2025–2026 government budget. Under the 2021 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership (reaffirmed in September 2025), China pledged $400 billion in investments for sectors like oil/gas, infrastructure, banking, telecom, ports, railways, and tourism. Infrastructure initiatives include a new railway for overland oil shipments (opened May 2025 but halted by war) and the first freight train from Xi’an to Iran’s Aprin dry port in May 2025. Discussions on economic corridors via Central Asia (e.g., May 2025 railway officials meeting) aim to enhance transit.

At least 3 senior Iranian officials (political and military) have visited China since July 1, 2025, based on publicly reported trips. These visits focused on multilateral summits (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation Organization events), bilateral cooperation, and post-conflict diplomacy following Iran’s tensions with Israel and the US:

Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Minister, political) — July 2025: Attended an SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in Tianjin and held bilateral talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on deepening ties and regional issues.

Masoud Pezeshkian (President, political) — September 1–2, 2025: Visited Beijing for the SCO Summit; met with President Xi Jinping to discuss comprehensive strategic partnership, trade, investment, and global governance.

Aziz Nasirzadeh (Defense Minister, military) — Late June 2025 (close to July threshold, often grouped in post-July reporting): Attended SCO defense ministers’ meeting in Qingdao; first reported foreign trip post-Israel conflict.

Iran’s efforts to resurrect a sound economy are being carried out under the shadow of renewed attacks by Israel and the United States. According to RT:

President Donald Trump warned the US could carry out further military strikes against Iran if it attempts to rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. He made the remarks to journalists alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida on Monday.

“If it’s confirmed, they know the consequences, and the consequences will be very powerful, maybe more powerful than the last time,” Trump said on Monday. “We’ll knock them down. We’ll knock the hell out of them. But hopefully that’s not happening.”

The US president indicated he would “absolutely” support Israeli military action against Iran’s missile program, saying the US would act “immediately” against any nuclear advances.

Rebuild ballistic missile programs? Looks like Donald Trump has not been informed that Iran’s ballistic missile programs were not destroyed during the 12-day war. Iran is not rebuilding… It is expanding and modernizing its ballistic missile force, which is safely stored below ground out of the reach of Israeli and US weapons. If Israel and Trump are foolish enough to attack Iran again, I think they will find Iran is a far more formidable and dangerous foe than the one they encountered in June 2025.

https://ronpaulinstitute.org/neocons-premature-celebration-over-protests-in-iran/

 

=================

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

watching....

Middle Eastern governments are watching Iran's protests
Cathrin Schaer [DW]

As anti-government protests continue in Iran, countries in the region are watching. Some are concerned; others sense potential opportunity.

 

Unrest is continuing in Iran, with protesters calling for a change of government. US President Donald Trump has threatened Iran's regime and Israel's spy agency, the Mossad, has expressed support for protesters.

It is unclear what impact the protests will have. The economically motivated demonstrations have been smaller than the last major uprisings, brutally repressed, in Iran in 2022.

There have been few overt reactions from Iran's allies, neighbors and enemies in the Middle East. But, given the level of involvement Iran has in the internal politics of many countries int he region, there's no doubt that leaders are watching carefully — some likely with concern, others potentially sensing opportunity should protests weaken Iran's government.

Saudi Arabia, UAE: 'Frenemies' for stability

Until comparatively recently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates considered Iran a geopolitical rival.

Iran is a Shiite Muslim-majority country. Most Gulf Arab states are Sunni Muslim. Additionally, Iran has also always expressed its opposition to the US and Israel, while the Gulf Arab states are beholden to the US for their defense and most have unofficial working relationships with Israel, at minimum.

Historically, this saw Iran and the largest Gulf states competing for influence and power in the Middle East.

Recently, this changed. Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran back in 2016, but restored them in early 2023 when China brokered what is now referred to as the "Beijing agreement."

The countries may still distrust one another. But "for the Saudis, regional stability comes first since economic prosperity cannot occur in a destabilized scenario," Eleonora Ardemagni, a research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, wrote in July.

And, despite ups and downs in diplomatic relations, the UAE has been one of Iran's strongest trading partners — the Emiratis are often described as providing a "lifeline" to the heavily sanctioned country — and restored diplomatic ties in 2022.

Iraq: Domestic interference

Iraq has a troubled relationship with Iran, with which it shares a 1,599-kilometer border. It fought a devastating war against Iran between 1980 and 1988, while dictator Saddam Hussein was in charge. Hussein was toppled by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and, over the two decades since, Iran has become an increasingly powerful political player in Iraq.

Iran supports a number of the Iraqi paramilitary groups known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF. Although first formed by Iraq's Shiite Muslim communities to fight the extremist group known as the "Islamic State," the PMF have since evolved to become a powerful part of Iraq's political and military system. Some pledge loyalty to Iranian religious and military leadership because Tehran has provided them with financial, logistical and even spiritual support.

The PMF groups are considered part of Iran's "Axis of Resistance," which is made up of groups opposed to the United States and Israel, and which also includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza. Supporting nonstate actors is part of Iran's "forward defense" strategy, which keeps fighting between Iran and its enemies, via these proxies, away from Iran's own borders.

 Lebanon: Difficult diplomatic ties

Iran has long been involved in Lebanese politics because of its sponsorship of the Lebanon-based, Shiite Muslim group, Hezbollah, which was created during the Lebanese civil war with the goal of expelling Western, US and Israeli forces.

Hezbollah not only has an armed wing, which has sworn opposition to Israel, but a wider social network, too, that includes welfare assistance for its supporters and their families, as well as politicians in Lebanon's diverse, multiconfessional parliament. Iran supplies Hezbollah with weapons and other military support, as well as helping to pay for the group's social work. 

Lebanon and Iran have formal diplomatic ties, although recently Lebanese-Iranian relations have been more fraught. A ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by the United States in late 2024, requires Hezbollah to disarm and makes the Lebanese government and military responsible for that. 

Syria: Battlefield enemies 

The new Syrian government is unlikely to be a big fan of Iran's regime. During the 14-year civil war, Iran's military and the Iran-supported Hezbollah group fought on the side of dictator Bashar Assad. Iran was deeply embedded in Syria's politics, military and society, and experts believe that Iran's regime, a longtime Assad ally, spent over $50 billion on this effort as it tried to maintain influence in a key base on the Mediterranean.

Syria's new government is headed by members of a militia that toppled the Assad regime. Its members likely battled Iranian troops or Hezbollah fighters during the civil war.

Nonetheless, Syria's new government, which doesn't have much military power of its own and is dealing with internal security issues as the country rebuilds, has said it is open to future ties with Iran — but only if Iran does not interfere in Syrian politics.

https://www.dw.com/en/middle-eastern-governments-are-watching-irans-protests/a-75372258

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.