SearchRecent comments
Democracy LinksMember's Off-site Blogs |
the most liveable cities in the world......
No Chinese city appears on the annual lists of the most liveable cities in the world. Is this due to ignorance or to a pervasive anti-China bias? What does one look for in a liveable city? According to three main annual global city surveys, factors include stability, culture and the environment, infrastructure, education standards and healthcare. Liveable cities of China
The Australian press trumpeted success this year when the Economist Intelligence Unit placed Melbourne fourth, with Copenhagen in top place. The _Monocle_ survey put Paris first. The latest Mercer survey, released in 2024, oriented to company considerations regarding expatriate staff, favoured Zurich, although it also mentioned Singapore, coming in at number 30. None of the three surveys rated any city in China. To me, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Chengdu and many other cities more than qualify for consideration, even according to the published criteria and, in addition, they have special qualities of their own. Mercer, Monocle and the EIU may have overlooked China through ignorance and lack of familiarity. It is more likely that their editors suffer from an unfortunate anti-China bias. Some people would never entertain the idea of living in China, believing it to be a police state, demanding total subservience to the government, monitoring its citizens every day, censoring communications, and definitely anti-foreign. There is probably not much I could say to convince them. My best advice would be to recommend a visit to check out the situation and not simply to believe what they read in the mainstream media. The urbanisation of China was one of the greatest and most successful social shifts of the last century. When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, more than 90% of the population was rural. Seventy-five years later, 70% is urban. The change came about without major social upheaval. Families moved from farms and villages into high-rise apartment buildings without the problems evident in many Western cities (including Monocle’s top-ranked Paris). Take Wuhan, where COVID was first identified in December 2019. It is famous as a “furnace”, where summer temperatures may exceed 40 degrees, but with innovative city planning including extensive greening, heat is no longer a major concern for residents. Flooding used to be a problem also, but Wuhan developed a “sponge city” where lakes soak up heavy rain. They reduce the temperature and provide abundant parks and recreation spaces. The Yangzi River Beach Park, more than seven kilometres long, includes a green buffer strip of trees and water gardens. Many of the city residents used to be housed in apartment blocks related to or owned by their employment. This had the advantage of convenient transport to and from work and promoted social cohesion, but when these older buildings were sold or demolished for redevelopment in the economic reform era, city planners maintained the community amenities by developing good public transport networks and providing parks and open paces that allow for free and open activities such as dance and exercise, and services such as public massage and haircuts. There are even foreign language classes and dating centres. Retirees and older citizens are encouraged to meet and mingle in these public spaces in line with government policies to promote healthy ageing. Beijing is my favourite city in China. I spent nearly seven years there as a diplomat and I have visited many times for business and pleasure. Laid out like a chessboard and planned to conform with geomantic and Confucian religious principles, Beijing’s structure has been preserved, although the city walls have gone and the central spine has been desecrated with modern political eyesores like the mausoleum of Mao Zedong. A splendid introduction to Beijing is Geremie Barmé’s _The Forbidden City_. I love the historic monuments and residential districts, and I marvel at its efficient metro system. It is totally safe to walk around the city if one chooses, even at night. Street crime hardly exists. Local universities such as Peking University and Qinghua rank among the top in the world, and leading artists, performance companies and exhibitions contribute to the vibrant cultural scene. Once, we diplomats needed to go to Hong Kong for shopping, but now the latest fashions and consumer goods from around the world are available, can be ordered on the phone and delivered to the door. At weekends and for the many public holidays, one can escape into the Western Hills or travel further afield on the network of expressways. Shanghai is China’s most cosmopolitan city. Some Australians have happily settled there for life. Although it has less than 200 years of urban history, Shanghai pays great attention to preserving its heritage. The city planners made a vital decision 40 years ago when they decided to develop a modern city centre on old industrial sites on the other side of the Huangpu, rather than demolish the old central business district. Few cities in the world now have such well-preserved 1920s-30s architecture. I recommend Anne Warr’s guidebook to old Shanghai, _Shanghai Architecture__._ Lynn Pan is also a great chronicler of the city. Her work describes the quintessential Shanghai quality of “chic”. Shanghai has fast rail and public electric vehicle transport. The streets are quiet. Much of the city’s energy comes from offshore wind and solar plants and more are under development. Parks and open spaces abound, and even the rail corridor doubles as green space. Best of all, in Shanghai, as in other cities, foreigners are welcomed with smiles and greetings. As mentioned above, the generally recognised necessary qualities of a liveable global city are stability, culture and the environment, infrastructure, education standards and healthcare. The political system in China is stable and its cities have low crime rates; Chinese culture is unique and well-preserved and heritage is cherished; China is doing more to mitigate climate change than many other countries; the urban infrastructure is technically advanced; education standards are amongst the highest in the world; and all cities have good public healthcare, modern hospitals and traditional Chinese medicine clinics. Besides this, Chinese cities have a unique cultural attribute in their policies designed to build community, and they welcome foreigners to visit, live and work. So there you have it. Why do surveys of liveable cities not include Wuhan, Beijing or Shanghai? https://johnmenadue.com/post/2025/09/liveable-cities-of-china/
YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.
Gus Leonisky POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.
AND MOSCOW?... SEE: https://yourdemocracy.net/drupal/node/31906 "It's the best city in the world, a city of unlimited possibilities. No other city has this much energy...."
|
User login |
chips ahoy....
Nexperia Seizure: How the Netherlands Turned a Chip Safeguard into a Strategic Misstep
Ricardo Martins
In an era of tightly woven global supply chains, the Dutch government’s forceful takeover of Nexperia is a masterclass in shortsighted policy and in rule-based order. By seizing a key semiconductor link under the guise of “security,” The Hague has endangered Europe’s industrial stability and credibility in the global marketplace.
In October 2025, the Netherlands became an unlikely battlefield in the global technology war. When The Hague invoked the Goods Availability Act—a Cold War-era emergency law—to seize control of Nexperia, a semiconductor manufacturer based in Nijmegen and owned by China’s Wingtech Technology, it did far more than protect a company. It sent a shockwave through global trade, raising questions about sovereignty, rule-based order, U.S. influence, and Europe’s readiness for a multipolar world.What the Case Is About
On 30 September 2025, Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs Vincent Karremans placed Nexperia under temporary state supervision under the never used Wet Beschikbaarheid Goederen (Goods Availability Act). The government cited “serious governance shortcomings” and alleged that Nexperia’s Chinese CEO, Zhang Xuezheng.
For the first time since the law’s creation in 1952, the Dutch state assumed operational control of a private company. Regular production could continue, but every major decision—investment, restructuring, asset sale—now required government approval.
The government defended its decision as a national-security intervention, not a political seizure. Yet the timing, just days after Washington expanded its export-control regime on Chinese-linked firms, made neutrality difficult to believe.
Whether seen as prudent defense or political servitude, the move exposes Europe’s strategic confusion: between autonomy and alignment, law and power, sovereignty and submissionOfficially, the Dutch Ministry claimed no foreign pressure. In a letter to Parliament dated 14 October 2025, Karremans wrote: “I issued this order without any pressure from or consultation with any other country”. But multiple analysts note that the move followed escalating U.S. warnings about Wingtech’s inclusion on the American Entity List, restricting access to U.S. technology. That listing, imposed in 2024, already classified Wingtech as a “national-security concern”.
Dutch officials may also have been influenced by internal turmoil: an Amsterdam court had temporarily suspended Zhang Xuezheng and transferred Nexperia’sshares to a trustee after allegations by European directors of “reckless governance.” Combined, these legal and political developments created a pretext for intervention under a law originally meant for wartime food or fuel shortages—not semiconductor management.
Pim Jansen, professor of Economic Law at Erasmus University, told Trouw, a respected Dutch daily known for its economic and political analysis, that the case blurred the line “between economic security and protectionism.” He questioned whether “poor governance or risk of dependency” truly qualified as an emergency justifying such an extraordinary step.
The American Shadow
The geopolitical backdrop is unmistakable. The United States has spent years pressing allies to curb China’s access to high-end chip technology, most famously in the ASML case, where Dutch firm ASML was barred from exporting advanced lithography machines to China. That episode already demonstrated Washington’s ability to shape Dutch industrial policy. The Nexperia intervention appears as its continuation.
According to OpIndia and Bloomberg, U.S. officials had privately warned that Nexperia could face sanctions unless changes were made to its management and ownership structure. The subsequent Dutch action conveniently aligned with those American concerns.
Beijing’s reaction was swift: it imposed an export ban on Nexperia’s Chinese subsidiaries, effectively cutting off the supply of key components to Europe and threatening to paralyze the continent’s automotive sector: “The Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued an export control notice prohibiting Nexperia China and its subcontractors from exporting specific finished components and sub-assemblies manufactured in China.”
The irony is stark: Europe seized Nexperia to “secure” chip supplies, but immediately triggered the opposite: scarcity.
Economic Fallout and Strategic Missteps
The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA)warned that the export ban could disrupt vehicle production across the continent. Nexperia’s chips, though not the newest generation, are the “nuts and bolts” of modern cars—transistors, diodes, and power-management circuits essential for electronic systems. Losing access to them exposes how dependent Europe remains on globally integrated supply chains.
The takeover, analysts say, undermines investor confidence in Europe’s commitment to open markets. Foreign investors now face the risk of government expropriation under vague “security” claims. Meanwhile, China sees the move as “a flagrant violation of international rules,” as Global Times put it, and may respond by tightening controls on rare-earth exports critical to European industries.
By prioritizing short-term security optics over long-term trade stability, the Netherlands may have eroded both. The episode echoes earlier Western actions, like freezing Russian reserves or banning Huawei, which blur the boundary between lawful regulation and economic warfare.
Servility or Strategy?
Is The Hague merely following Washington’s script, or does it have an independent rationale? The answer may lie in Europe’s growing pursuit of “strategic autonomy.” European policymakers increasingly argue that control over semiconductor supply is as vital as energy independence. Yet, as Professor Jansen warned, invoking emergency powers risks turning autonomy into isolationism.
Critics argue that the Dutch decision reflects a “vassal logic”—Europe’s willingness to jeopardize its industrial base to satisfy U.S. containment goals against China.
Supporters counter that, given China’s own export restrictions and opaque corporate structures, governments must act pre-emptively to shield critical technologies from capture or coercion.
Still, the lack of transparency—no published evidence of the alleged “improper transfers”—fuels suspicion that the intervention was politically timed and externally influenced.
Analysts’ Insights and Lessons Learned
Most analysts converge on three takeaways:
-National security is becoming a universal pretext.
As Financial Times observed, governments now treat chips like oil—strategic assets justifying state control. This creates a “new normal” where property rights yield to geopolitical logic.
-Europe risks undermining its own industrial resilience.
By alienating Chinese investors and triggering supply retaliation, the Netherlands exposed the fragility of Europe’s chip and automotive ecosystems. As ACEA noted, semiconductor shortages could again halt production lines, but this time, self-inflicted.
-The rules-based order is fraying.
What began as a Cold War-era safeguard has now become a weapon of economic containment and “flagrant breach of market economy principles,” crumbling Western ‘rules-based order’ principle.
Conclusion: Between Autonomy and Alignment
The Dutch seizure of Nexperia marks a turning point. It reveals how the trade war has evolved from tariffs to boardroom battles and state takeovers, where national interest and alliance politics collide. Whether seen as prudent defense or political servitude, the move exposes Europe’s strategic confusion: between autonomy and alignment, law and power, sovereignty and submission.
If “national security” becomes the ultimate justification for economic intervention, then the post-war liberal order, based on open trade and legal certainty, may already be over. The next question is not who controls Nexperia, but whether Europe still controls its own strategic destiny.
Ricardo Martins, PhD in Sociology, specializing in International Relations and Geopolitics
https://journal-neo.su/2025/10/24/nexperia-seizure-how-the-netherlands-turned-a-chip-safeguard-into-a-strategic-misstep/
READ FROM TOP.
YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT — SINCE 2005.
Gus Leonisky
POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.