IN 2012, CRIKEY POSTED A SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC ARTICLE ON THE IRANIAN URANIUM DEAL:... 

For a couple of months things have been looking pretty bleak on the Iranian front. Many observers seem to be gripped by a deep pessimism — a feeling that Israel and the US are locked on a trajectory towards war with Iran, which everyone accepts would be a disaster but nobody seems to know how to stop.

 

Only faint hope for a deal with Iran on nukes

For a couple of months things have been looking pretty bleak on the Iranian front.

 

CHARLES RICHARDSON

JAN 30, 2012

 

The background is a report released in November by the international atomic energy agency that gave increased credence to the claims that Iran is on the way to developing nuclear weapons. The evidence for this conclusion is still fairly thin, but when it comes to Iranian intentions, western countries, rightly or not, have gotten into the habit of assuming the worst.

Hence the fresh sanctions against Iran introduced by the US and the EU in the last week — and also a glimmer of hope on Friday, with a statement from president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Iran “is ready to sit down with world powers for talks on its alleged nuclear ambitions”. A new IAEA team arrived in Tehran at the weekend “to start with a dialogue”.

Sanctions do sometimes work; worldwide sanctions against South Africa are generally seen as having made an important contribution to the fall of apartheid. But they are at best a blunt instrument, and most of the time their effects have ranged from negligible to horribly counter-productive.

There is also an unfortunate tendency for sanctions to be imposed as a knee-jerk response, without clear thought about what they are intended to achieve. Like law-and-order policies that are driven by a desire to punish criminals rather than a desire to reduce crime, sanctions are sometimes the product of dislike of the offending regime, independent of any calculation of how they might serve their purpose.

In the Iranian case, there has been a discernible difference between the American and European approaches. The Europeans have conceded all along Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have focused simply on stopping the (alleged) weapons program. The US seems more set on stopping any nuclear activity and even on promoting regime change in Iran (although there’s no particular evidence that a democratic Iran would be any more tractable on the issue).

But there’s one sense in which sanctions do often work: they are an alternative to war, and their very availability can stop what would otherwise be a slide into open hostilities. Sanctions against Italy in the 1930s didn’t do anything for their ostensible purpose of saving the Ethiopians, but they were quite effective in achieving what was probably Britain and France’s real purpose, namely staying out of war. Hence it’s been suggested that Israel’s recent sabre-rattling has in fact achieved its purpose by forcing the West into tougher sanctions and that the threat of actual military action has therefore receded.

If so, however, the effect may be only temporary. The US is heading into a presidential election where the Republicans seem bent on global war against Islam, and even assuming they lose the administration may well be pushed further in that direction. Their goal is not just regime change (there’s been plenty of that in the Middle East recently), but specifically regime change imposed by American arms. One candidate, Newt Gingrich, has even suggested that Turkey (an American ally) is a terrorist regime; he would certainly not be showing any favours to Iran.

As for Israel, I confess defeat; while we should always try to interpret the actions of governments in terms of their rational motivations, Israeli politics seems to have moved beyond the point where that is possible. Imagine an Australia with Pauline Hanson as foreign minister and you have something of the flavour of what the world is dealing with.

No one wants Iran to have the bomb, but opinions differ widely about just how great a problem it would be. If there really is a weapons program, it seems overwhelmingly likely that its purpose is defensive: having seen what happened to Iraq, the Iranians want to have a deterrent on hand to avoid a similar fate. The world could probably live with a nuclear-armed Iran, but in view of the nature of the Iranian regime and the instability of the region it makes sense to prefer not to.

So even if the chance of a compromise settlement seems slim, it needs to be grasped with both hands. The chance might not come again.

https://www.crikey.com.au/2012/01/30/only-faint-hope-for-a-deal-with-iran-on-nukes/

 

OBAMA MADE THE DEAL IN 2015

 

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What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?
Diplomacy to revive this arms control agreement has faced multiple stumbling blocks, including Iran’s nuclear advances and its links to conflicts in the Gaza Strip and Ukraine.

 

Kali Robinson
Last updated October 27, 2023 2:40 pm (EST)

 

Summary

• Signed in 2015 by Iran and several world powers, including the United States, the JCPOA placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
• President Trump withdrew the United States from the deal in 2018, claiming it failed to curtail Iran’s missile program and regional influence. Iran began ignoring limitations on its nuclear program a year later.
• Washington and Tehran have both said they would return to the original deal, but they disagree on the steps to get there.

Introduction

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

Proponents of the deal said that it would help prevent a revival of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and thereby reduce the prospects for conflict between Iran and its regional rivals, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018. In retaliation for the U.S. departure and for deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including one by the United States, Iran has resumed its nuclear activities. UN inspectors reported in early 2023 that Iran had enriched trace amounts of uranium to nearly weapons-grade levels, sparking international alarm. 

President Joe Biden said that the United States would return to the JCPOA if Iran came back into compliance, but after more than two years of stop-and-go talks, the countries are nowhere near a compromise, and as of late 2023, provisions of the agreement have started to expire.

RELATED What Are Economic Sanctions?by Jonathan Masters Could a U.S.-Iran Deal Lead to a Nuclear Thaw?by Ray TakeyhWho are the participants?

The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program. At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1. The European Union (EU) also took part.

Some Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia, said they should have been consulted or included in the talks because they would be most affected by a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel explicitly opposed the agreement, calling it too lenient.

What were the goals?

The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran’s nuclear program to the point that if Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one year, giving world powers time to respond. Heading into the JCPOA negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a few months. Negotiating nations feared that Iran’s moves to become a nuclear weapons state risked thrusting the region into a new crisis. One concern was that Israel would take preemptive military action against suspected nuclear facilities in Iran, as it had in Iraq and Syria, perhaps triggering reprisals by Lebanon-based Hezbollah or disruptions to the transport of oil in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has since signaled a willingness to obtain a nuclear weapon if Iran successfully detonates one.

Iran had previously agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has been in force since 1970. However, after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, Iranian leaders secretly pursued this technology. (In 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that Iran halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003 but continued to acquire nuclear technology and expertise.)

Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years, offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment. After the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, who was viewed as a reformer, the parties came to a preliminary agreement to guide negotiations for a comprehensive deal.

For its part, Iran sought the JCPOA for relief from international sanctions, which starved its economy [PDF] of more than $100 billion in revenues in 2012–14 alone.

Does it prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons?

Many experts say that if all parties adhered to their pledges, the deal almost certainly could have achieved that goal for longer than a decade. Many of the JCPOA’s restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program have expiration dates. For example, after ten years (from January 2016), centrifuge restrictions would be lifted, and after fifteen years, so too would limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess. Some of the deal’s opponents faulted these so-called sunset provisions, saying they would only delay Iran building a bomb while sanctions relief would allow it to underwrite terrorism in the region.

What did Iran agree to?

Nuclear restrictions. Iran agreed not to produce either the highly enriched uranium or the plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It also took steps to ensure that its Fordow, Natanz, and Arak facilities pursued only civilian work, including medical and industrial research.

The accord limited the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate, the level of its enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium. (Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235 isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope’s concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear weapons.)

Monitoring and verification. Iran agreed to eventually implement a protocol that would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, unfettered access to its nuclear facilities and potentially to undeclared sites. Inspections are intended to guard against the possibility that Iran develops nuclear arms in secret, as it has allegedly attempted before. The IAEA has issued quarterly reports to its board of governors and the UN Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments.

A body known as the Joint Commission, which includes representatives of all the negotiating parties, monitors implementation of the agreement and resolves any disputes that arise. A majority vote by its members can gain IAEA inspectors access to suspicious, undeclared sites. The body also oversees the transfer of nuclear-related or dual-use materials.

What did the other signatories agree to?

Sanctions relief. The EU, United Nations, and United States all committed to lifting their nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, many other U.S. sanctions on Iran, some dating back to the 1979 hostage crisis, remained in effect. They cover matters such as Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for terrorist groups, and human rights abuses. Though the United States committed to lifting its sanctions on oil exports, it kept restrictions on financial transactions, which have deterred international trade with Iran.

Weapons embargo. The parties agreed to lift an existing UN ban[PDF] on Iran’s transfer of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles after five years if the IAEA certified that Iran only engaged in civilian nuclear activity.

How is the Iran deal enforced?

If any signatory suspects Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security Council can vote on whether to continue sanctions relief. This “snapback” mechanism remains in effect for ten years, after which the UN sanctions are set to be permanently removed.

In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to snap back sanctions. The other P5 members objected to the move, saying the United States could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the nuclear deal in 2018.

Did Iran comply initially?

The agreement got off to a fairly smooth start. The IAEA certified in early 2016 that Iran had met its preliminary pledges; and the United States, EU, and United Nations responded by repealing or suspending their sanctions. Most significantly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration dropped secondary sanctions on the oil sector, which allowed Iran to ramp up its oil exports to nearly the level it reached prior to sanctions. The United States and many European nations also unfroze about $100 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets.

However, the deal has been near collapse since President Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018 and reinstated devastating banking and oil sanctions. Trump said the agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its proxy warfare in the region, and he claimed that the sunset provisions would enable Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

Iran accused the United States of reneging on its commitments, and faulted Europe for submitting to U.S. unilateralism. In a bid to keep the agreement alive, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched a barter system known as INSTEX to facilitate transactions with Iran outside of the U.S. banking system. INSTEX was used only once before France and Germany announced its dissolution in 2023, citing Iranian obstruction.

Following the U.S. withdrawal, several countries—U.S. allies among them—continued to import Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump administration, and Iran continued to abide by its commitments. But a year later, the United States ended the waivers with the aim of halting Iran’s oil exports completely.

What is Iran’s current nuclear activity?

In response to the other parties’ actions, which Tehran claimed amounted to breaches of the deal, Iran started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium in 2019, and began enriching uranium to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for weapons). It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility; and enriching uranium [PDF] at Fordow, which rendered the isotopes produced there unusable for medical purposes.

In 2020, Iran took more steps away from its nuclear pledges, following a series of attacks on its interests. In January, after the United States’ targeted killing of top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, Iran announced that it would no longer limit its uranium enrichment. In October, it began constructing a centrifuge production center at Natanz to replace one that was destroyed months earlier in an attack it blamed on Israel. And in November, in response to the assassination of a prominent nuclear scientist, which it also attributed to Israel, Iran’s parliament passed a law that led to a substantial boost in uranium enrichment at Fordow.

Tehran has increasingly limited the IAEA’s ability to inspect its facilities since Washington withdrew from the nuclear deal, though it pledged in March 2023 to boost cooperation with the agency. The commitment came months after IAEA inspectors detected uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent at Fordow, prompting international concern.

How has the deal affected Iran’s economy?

Prior to the JCPOA, Iran’s economy suffered years of recession, currency depreciation, and inflation, largely because of sanctions on its energy sector. With the sanctions lifted, inflation slowed, exchange rates stabilized, and exports—especially of oil, agricultural goods, and luxury items­—skyrocketed as Iran regained trading partners, particularly in the EU. After the JCPOA took effect, Iran began exporting more than 2.1 million barrels per day (approaching pre-2012 levels, when the oil sanctions were originally put in place). However, these improvements did not translate to a significant increase in the average Iranian household’s budget.

The end of sanctions waivers on oil exports and the restoration of U.S. sanctions in 2018 cut deeply into a vital source of national revenue: that year, oil and petroleum products accounted for 80 percent [PDF] of Iran’s exports. By 2020, exports of Iranian crude had fallen as low as one hundred thousand barrels per day. Since then, sales to China have helped boost crude exports, which averaged 1.1–1.2 million barrels per day by the end of 2022. Additionally, in October of that year, the United States imposed sanctions on eighteen major Iranian banks, causing the Iranian rial to fall further against the U.S. dollar.

Meanwhile, the wide range of U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program have added to the damage. Multinational firms fear being punished by the United States for transacting with sanctioned Iranian entities associated with, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which holds sway over many industries. With sanctions deterring international trade, black markets have boomed, enriching the IRGC at the expense of the regular economy.

What is the outlook for the agreement?

JCPOA signatories have struggled to revive the essentially defunct deal. The countries began talks to bring Washington and Tehran back into the agreement in April 2021, but negotiations have since been off and on, complicated by developments such as Iran’s election of conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the 2023 Israel-Hamas war. Iran’s apparent involvement in the two conflicts even earned it additional sanctions. Just as certain UN-mandated provisions of the JCPOA were set to expire in October 2023, the Biden administration imposed new sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs, and the EU refused to terminate the sanctions on its end. Moreover, Washington and Tehran still disagree on several issues related to rejoining the agreement, including the IRGC’s designation as a terrorist organization, and U.S. officials say further nuclear advances by Iran could make returning to the original deal impossible.

 

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

 

 

NOW, TRUMP WANTS A DEAL...

CNN — 

Delegations from Iran and the United States will meet again next week after wrapping up “constructive” nuclear talks that included the first direct contact between a Trump administration and an Iranian official, according to Iran’s state news agency.

The talks, held in the Gulf Arab nation of Oman and mediated by its Foreign Minister Badr Al Busaidi, were largely indirect, with the Omani minister relaying messages between the two delegations that were seated in separate rooms, Iranian media reported. The American side was represented by the Trump administration’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, Iranian and Omani officials said.

The meetings were held “in a constructive atmosphere based on mutual respect,” Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency said.

 

“After more than two and a half hours of indirect negotiations, the heads of the Iranian and American delegations spoke for a few minutes in the presence of the Omani foreign minister as they left the talks,” the agency reported.

Speaking to state media after the meeting, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the next round of talks will be held in Oman on April 19, adding that Saturday’s meeting “got very close” to reaching a framework for negotiations. Both sides said they are seeking an agreement in the shortest time possible, he said.

The White House also described the talks as “positive and constructive” and a “step forward in achieving a mutually beneficial outcome.”

 

Witkoff “underscored to Dr. Araghchi that he had instructions from President Trump to resolve our two nations’ differences through dialogue and diplomacy, if that is possible,” the White House said in a statement.

The high-stakes talks to reach a new nuclear deal began on Saturday, foreshadowed by President Trump’s threat of military strikes as a consequence of failure and Tehran’s warning any attack on it would drag the US into a broader Middle Eastern conflict.

Iran was seeking an “initial understanding” with the US that could lead to a negotiations process, Araghchi said upon arriving in the Omani capital Muscat.

Al Busaidi said on X that Iran and the US will begin a process aimed at reaching a “fair and binding” agreement following the meeting.

President Donald Trump has given Tehran a two-month deadline to accept a deal that would lead to Iran shrinking its nuclear footprint or eliminating its program altogether.

“I want them not to have a nuclear weapon. I want Iran to be a wonderful, great, happy country, but they can’t have a nuclear weapon,” Trump said aboard Air Force One on his way to Florida on Friday night.

The talks come after the Islamic Republic has seen its regional power projection significantly weakened over the past 18 months by Israeli strikes on its proxies, the toppling of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and unprecedented attacks inside its own borders.

The stakes are high: Trump said military strikes are possible against Iran if a new nuclear deal isn’t reached, though he said Israel – which has been advocating for an attack on Iran – would take the lead.

“If it requires military, we’re going to have military,” Trump said on Wednesday. “Israel will obviously be very much involved in that. They’ll be the leader of that.”

But Iran has repeatedly refused to negotiate under duress. It laid out its “red lines” for the talks on Friday, including “threatening” language, “excessive demands” regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s defense industry, according to semi-state news agency Tasnim, likely referring to Tehran’s ballistic missile program, which the United States’ Middle Eastern allies see as a threat to their security.

Witkoff’s participation in the talks adds another file to the array of complex and intractable issues in his expanding portfolio, and follow a face-to-face meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine in St Petersburg on Friday.

While the precise agenda for the next round of talks remains unclear, the president has vowed to secure a “stronger” agreement than the 2015 nuclear deal brokered by the Obama administration, which was meant to curb Iran’s nuclear program. Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, calling it a “disastrous” agreement that gave money to a regime that sponsored terrorism.

Trump wants to strike a deal that will prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, but has not specified how it would be different to the previous agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA. That deal was intended to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions that have crippled its economy.

US officials have hinted they may push Iran to fully dismantle its nuclear program, including its civilian energy component, which Tehran is entitled to under a UN nuclear treaty.

Iranian officials, however, have dismissed that proposal as a non-starter, accusing the US of using it as a pretext to weaken and ultimately topple the Islamic Republic.

Experts say Tehran sees its nuclear program as its greatest source of leverage and abandoning it would leave the country dangerously exposed.

But the administration also says it is not only looking at a possible nuclear deal: It also wants to engage Iran on a broad range of issues, a senior administration official said.

The meeting on Saturday would have tested if Iran is willing to have high-level discussions, that could lead to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile program, and support for proxies in the region, the official said.

“Iran would be eager to jump back into something like JCPOA, so the question is: are they willing to put anything else on the table?” the official said.

Ahead of the meeting on Saturday, Araghchi reiterated that the talks “at this point” are “from our perspective, solely focused on the nuclear issue.”

Advisers try carrot while Trump wields stick

While Trump is threatening the prospect of war as a consequence for failed talks, other US officials have struck a far less bellicose tone.

Witkoff emphasized late last month that a diplomatic solution is within reach. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, he touted US military strength and laid out Iran’s vulnerabilities but was quick to clarify: “This is not a threat.”

“If the Iranians ever listen to this broadcast, this is not me issuing a threat. It’s the president who has that authority,” he said.

One former US official said the talks could be a starting point for both sides to suss out whether further negotiations are even possible.

“Saturday at best is a table setting exercise, to determine whether a deal is even possible,” said a former US official who has negotiated with Iran on nuclear issues.

“I suspect Iran will purport to demonstrate flexibility as the devil is in the details in nuclear talks, and the details are unlikely to be addressed in this opening episode,” the former official said.

For now it’s not a negotiation, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce cautioned, but a meeting with a specific goal.

“The very specific thing that needs to be accomplished, which would make the world a much safer place, is to make sure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon,” Bruce told reporters.

Iran’s supreme leader indicated with a recent letter to Trump an openness to talks that could lead to Iran agreeing to measures that would prevent it from building a nuclear weapon.

But the planning process for Saturday’s high-stakes talks have been bumpy.

At times this week there have been questions among those involved as to whether they were even going to happen, given Iran was saying they would only engage indirectly while Trump insisted there would be a direct meeting.

Constant threats against Iran serve as backdrop to talks

In a Washington Post article this week, Araghchi warned that a war on Iran would drag the US – and the region – into a costly conflict that a president, who was elected on an anti-war platform, would be eager to avoid.

“We cannot imagine President Trump wanting to become another US president mired in a catastrophic war in the Middle East – a conflict that would quickly extend across the region and cost exponentially more than the trillions of taxpayer dollars that his predecessors burned in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he wrote.

Trump administration officials have credited Israel’s actions for the position Iran finds itself in, with Witkoff saying Israel’s strikes left Iran’s defenses “eviscerated.”

But despite the united front with Israel that US administration officials have presented publicly, Trump’s announcement this week about Saturday’s talks seemed to come as a surprise to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was seated next to him. Two Israeli sources told CNN the announcement was “certainly not” to Israel’s liking.

Upon returning, Netanyahu, said that if the nuclear talks drag on, it may strike Iran anyway.

CNN previously reported that US intelligence agencies warned both the Biden and Trump administrations that Israel appears likely to strike targets associated with Iran’s nuclear program as part of that country’s mission to enact a regime change in the Islamic Republic.

CNN’s Michael Williams, Alayna Treene, Alireza Hajihosseini, Pauline Lockwood, Nadeen Ebrahim, Eyad Kourdi, Dalia Abdelwahab and Leila Gharagozlou contributed to this report.

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/11/politics/us-iran-nuclear-talks/index.html

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.