Wednesday 2nd of July 2025

tel aviv's defiance and washington's duplicity have history.....

From the outset, Moscow condemned Israel's aggression against Iran in sharp terms. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s first official statement left no ambiguity in assigning blame to Tel Aviv.

Until 20 June, Russia clung to the belief that a ceasefire could be brokered and that Washington would refrain from direct strikes on Iran. This optimism stemmed from a nearly hour-long phone conversation on 14 June, during which US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, discussed the escalating Israel–Iran conflict. Trump reportedly stated during the call, “this war in Israel–Iran should end,” a message echoed later on his Truth Social feed. 

 

Russia confronts US betrayal in Israel–Iran war
Tel Aviv's defiance and Washington's duplicity have shattered every last bit of Moscow's illusions of diplomacy, forcing the Kremlin to reckon with the collapse of its balancing act in West Asia – and even Ukraine.

BY Hazal Yalin

 

Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov reported that US negotiators were open to returning to talks on Iran’s nuclear program. For Moscow, this was not merely optimism — it was interpreted as a real diplomatic overture and a potential backchannel for Trump to defuse mounting domestic and legal pressures.

From Moscow’s view: A timeline of misjudged hopes

This belief informed Moscow’s early posture. Even after Tel Aviv launched its unlawful strikes on Iran, the Russians avoided directly blaming Washington. Instead, they pinned principal responsibility on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right cabinet, denouncing Israel's leadership while keeping communication channels open. 

In his 18–19 June press conference with international media agencies – deliberately scheduled late at night to be picked up by US audiences – Putin emphasized ongoing direct lines with both Trump and Netanyahu. He pointed out that the attacks had only solidified Iran’s internal political unity and noted that the bombings did little to harmTehran’s nuclear infrastructure, saying, “These underground factories remain intact. Nothing happened to them.”

Putin also made clear that a resolution was still on the table: a framework that could ensure Iran’s peaceful nuclear rights while addressing Israeli security concerns, and confirmed that Russia had presented these options to all three sides. 

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) – Russia's premier annual business and diplomacy gathering – Putin reiterated Moscow's diplomatic approach, noting that Russia had presented “some ideas” for a settlement to all sides. He also reaffirmed support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear development, referencing Russia’s ongoing construction at the Bushehr nuclear facility. 

Putin stated that he had requested safety guarantees for Russian personnel there, and added, “Prime Minister Netanyahu has agreed with that, and President Trump has promised to support our legitimate demands.”

But that facade would collapse almost instantly. Shortly after Israel claimed it had targeted the Bushehr plant – only to later retract the statement, calling it a “mistake” – it bombed the city’s airport, destroying its international terminal. 

The attack, less than 36 hours after public reassurances, was viewed in Moscow as a deliberate humiliation. It extinguished any remaining belief that Tel Aviv or Washington were operating in good faith.

Moscow’s tone hardened. UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia’s 20 June speech marked the last instance of diplomatic optimism: 

“We are convinced that it is quite possible to forge a solution that would both respect Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities and ensure the unconditional security of the Jewish state. We have conveyed these options to our American and Israeli colleagues, as well as to our Iranian partners.”

After 22 June: Anger and reassessment in Moscow

Everything changed on 22 June. The US bombing campaign confirmed what many in Moscow had feared: that Washington was not only unwilling to mediate, but had used Russia’s overtures as strategic cover. 

Russian political elites began to speak in stark terms. Andrey Klishas, head of the constitutional committee in the Federation Council, was blunt: 

“The Islamic Republic will be compelled to respond to the violation of sovereignty and aggression against its country, because a regime that cannot defend the sovereignty of its state is always doomed.”

On 23 June, the influential Telegram news-analysis channel Yoj – with over 500,000 subscribers – reported that the Kremlin had quietly advised state television to avoid portraying Trump as a peace-seeking figure. 

According to Yoj, Putin was still holding off direct attacks on Trump, but that could change. “If the president sees Trump as willing to use force against Russia over Ukraine, he will abandon restraint. That scenario, despite Trump’s talk of peace, is now considered entirely plausible within the Kremlin.”

Anger echoed through official channels. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statements were seething. UN Ambassador Nebenzia, speaking at the UN Security Council, declared, “Washington has once again demonstrated its total disregard for the position of the international community and confirmed that in defense of its Israeli ally it is prepared to wager the safety and well‑being of all humanity.”

Even Putin, typically cautious in foreign briefings, took an unusually blunt line during his 23 June meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. According to Iranian outlets Jamaran and Shabestan, Putin described the US airstrikes as “an unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression,” and emphasized that “the provocative aggression against Iran is without any basis or justification.” 

The president's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, was even more direct, hinting that Moscow would be prepared to deliver whatever Iran needed to counter this illegal and unprincipled war:

“We have offered our mediation effort, this is something concrete, we have declared our position, which is a very clear statement, a form of support for the Iranian side. From now on it all depends on what Iran needs right now.”

Asked whether Iran will be given Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, Peskov suggested that Iran need only ask, stating, “It all depends on what the Iranian side and our Iranian friends say.”

Why the Iran–Russia ‘strategic pact’ falls short

The much-discussed “comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement” between Russia and Iran has turned out to be less than it appeared – particularly on military terms. While many assumed that Moscow was reluctant to deepen security ties, official Russian accounts suggest the opposite is true.

It was Iran’s parliament that delayed ratifying the agreement for nearly two months after Russia's Duma passed it in late May. On 18 June, Putin – when asked by an AFP reporter whether Russia would supply new air defense systems to Iran – clarified that not only had Moscow offered to supply them, it had proposed co-production. Iran, he said, had so far not accepted and had not made any formal request.

Two days earlier, Duma Deputy Svetlana Zhurova told Russian media that while the pact included arms sales, military training, and intelligence exchange, Iran had refused any clause allowing deployment of Russian troops. She added. “Everyone sells weapons – that’s standard. But sending personnel? That’s outside the agreement.”

On 23 June, hours before Putin’s meeting with Araghchi, Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chair Alexei Zhuravlyov confirmed, “One should not expect a Russian expeditionary corps in Iran … the relevant clauses were removed from the Russian–Iranian agreement at Tehran’s request.”

Tehran has made no effort to contradict these statements. The evidence points to Iran setting clear limits – possibly to avoid appearing overly reliant on Russia, or to maintain maneuverability in the emerging multipolar order. Furthermore, while Iran's constitution does not explicitly include a formal declaration of non-alignment, the concept of “neither east nor west” has been a central tenet of Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 revolution.

And although since the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi administration, Tehran has geared itself to primarily “Look east,” his successor appears to have boomeranged by opening indirect talks with the Americans. Given the colossal betrayals of trust displayed by the Trump administration since 16 June, however, current Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's west-leaning options may have narrowed considerably.

Looking ahead: Can Moscow still build a regional axis?

An earlier analysis published in The Cradle argues that peace in West Asia would hinge on new alliances – and that even provocations by Tel Aviv might be tempered in the short term by mutual caution. That assumption has now collapsed. Washington’s actions, paired with Israel’s targeted escalation, have pushed the region into a far more volatile phase.

The only viable option now may lie in Moscow and Beijing pressing harder – with Persian Gulf states, and especially Saudi Arabia – to develop an alternative regional security framework. 

While fragile, a few openings remain: Riyadh’s sharp condemnation of the Israeli attack on Iran, its public objection to Iran’s retaliatory strike aimed at US-linked bases in Qatar, its reluctance to align against Russia on Ukraine, and broader hedging behavior in West Asia may offer a narrow path forward.

That said, the ruins of Syria still cast a long shadow. There is little certainty that Moscow can convert tactical understandings into strategic alliances. However, without such a shift, the path forward leads not to de-escalation, but to an even broader regional war.

 

https://thecradle.co/articles/russia-confronts-US-betrayal-in-israel-iran-war

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.

"winning"....

 

The ‘long war’ to subvert Iran, weaken Russia, BRICS and China is on hold. It is not over.

 

by Alastair CROOKE

 

At one level, Iran plainly ‘won’. Trump had wanted to be regaled with a reality-TV style, splendid ‘Victory’. Sunday’s attack on the three nuclear sites indeed was loudly proclaimed by Trump and Hegseth as such – having ‘obliterated’ Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme, they claimed. ‘Destroyed it completely’, they insist.

Only … it didn’t: The strike caused superficial surface damage, perhaps. And seemingly was co-ordinated in advance with Iran via intermediaries to be a ‘once and done’ affair. This is a habitual Trump pattern (advance co-ordination). It was the mode in Syria, Yemen and even with Trump’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani – all intended to give Trump a quick media ‘victory’.

The so-called ‘ceasefire’ that rapidly followed the U.S. strikes – albeit not without some hiccoughs – was a hastily assembled ‘cessation of hostilities’ (and no ceasefire– as no terms were agreed). It was a ‘stop-gap’. What this means is that the negotiating impasse between Iran and Witkoff remains unresolved.

The Supreme Leader has forcefully laid down Iran’s position: ‘No surrender’; Enrichment proceeds; and the U.S. should quit the region and keep its nose out of Iranian affairs.

So, on the positive side of cost-benefit analysis, Iran likely has enough centrifuges and 450 kg of highly enriched uranium – and nobody (except Iran) now knows where the stash is hidden. Iran will resume processing. A second plus for Iran is that the IAEA and its Director-General Grossi have been so egregiously subversive of Iranian sovereignty that the Agency most likely will be expelled from Iran. The Agency failed in its basic responsibility to safeguard sites at which enriched uranium was present.

The U.S. and European intelligence services thus will lose their ‘eyes’ on the ground – as well as forego the IAEA’s Artificial Intelligence data collection (on which Israel’s identification of targets likely was heavily dependent).

On the cost side, militarily, Iran of course suffered physical damage, but retains its missile potency. The U.S.-Israeli narrative of Iranian skies as ‘open wide’ to Israeli aircraft is yet another deception contrived to support the ‘winning narrative’:

As Simplicius notes“There remains not a single shred of proof that Israeli (or American, for that matter) planes ever significantly overflew Iran at any time. Claims of ‘total air superiority’ have no grounds. [Footage] up until the final day shows Israel continued relying on their heavy UCAVs [large surveillance and strike drone aircraft] to strike Iranian ground targets”. 

Furthermore, drop tanks from Israeli planes were recorded washing up on Iran’s northernmost Caspian shores, suggesting rather, stand-off missile launches were being mounted by Israel’s Air Force from the north (i.e. from Azerbaijani airspace).

Up a level in the cost-benefit analysis, one must move to the bigger picture: That the destruction of the nuclear programme was pretext, yet not the main objective. The Israelis themselves say that the decision to attack the Iranian State was taken last September/October (2024). Israel’s intricate, costly and sophisticated plan (de-capitation, targeted assassinations, cyber-attack and the infiltration of drone-equipped sabotage cells) that unfolded during the 13 June sneak attack was focussed on one immediate aim: the implosion of the Iranian state, paving the path to chaos and ‘regime change’.

Did Trump believe in the Israeli delusion that Iran was on the brink of imminent collapse? Very likely, he did. Did he believe the Israeli story (reportedly concocted by the IAEA Mosaic programme) that Iran was speeding ‘towards a nuclear weapon’? It seems possible that Trump was suckered – or more likely, was willing prey – to the Israeli and U.S. Israeli-Firster narrative building.

As the Ukraine issue has proved more intractable than Trump expected, the Israeli promise of an ‘Iran ready to implode, Syria-style’ – an ‘Epic’ transformation to a ‘New Middle East’ – must have been alluring enough for Trump to brusquely sweep aside Tulsi Gabbard’s assertion that Iran had no nuclear weapon.

So, has the Iranian military response and the massive popular rallying to the flag been a ‘big win’ for Iran? Well, it is certainly a ‘win’ over the ‘brink of regime change’ pedlars; yet perhaps the ‘win’ needs refining? It is not a ‘forever win’. Iran cannot afford to let its guard down.

‘Iranian unconditional surrender’ is, of course, now off the cards. But the point here is that the Israel establishment, the pro-Israeli lobby in the U.S. (and possibly Trump too), will continue to believe that the only way to guarantee that Iran never moves toward threshold weapon status – is not through intrusive inspections and monitoring, but precisely via ‘regime change’ and the installation of a purely western puppet in Tehran.

The ‘long war’ to subvert Iran, weaken Russia, BRICS and China is on hold. It is not over. Iran cannot afford to relax or to neglect its defences. What is at stake is the U.S. attempt to control the Middle East and its oil as a buttress to its dollar trading primacy.

Professor Hudson notes that “Trump had expected that countries would respond to his tariff chaos by reaching an agreement not to trade with China – and indeed to accept trade and financial sanctions against China, Russia and Iran”. Clearly, both Russia and China understand the geo-financial stakes surrounding a ‘no surrender’ Iran. And they understand too, how regime change would make Russia’s southern underbelly vulnerable; how it could collapse the BRICS trade corridors, and be used as a wedge separating Russia from China.

Put plainly: the U.S. long war likely will be resumed in a new format. Iran notably has survived this acute phase of the confrontation. Israel and the U.S. bet all on an uprising of the Iranian people. It didn’t happen: Iranian society united in the face of aggression. And the mood is more robust; more resolute.

However, Iran will ‘win’ all the more if the authorities seize on the euphoria of a united society to impart a new energy into the Iranian Revolution. The euphoria will not last forever – absent action. It is a paradoxical and unexpected opportunity offered to the Republic.

Israel, by contrast, having launched its ‘psychic-shock war’ to overturn the Iranian State, has quickly found itself in a situation where its enemy did not surrender, but responded. Israel found itself the target of large-scale retaliatory strikes. The situation quickly became critical – both economically and in the depletion of air defences – as Netanyahu’s desperate appeals to the U.S. for rescue, duly attested.

Moving to the wider geo-political cost-benefit level, Israel’s standing (at the regional level) of being unassailable when fused to American power, has taken a blow: ‘Think of it this way, in ten or twenty years, what will be remembered … [the de-capitation strike and the targeted killings of scientists] … or the fact that Israeli cities burned for the first time; that Israel failed to defang Iran’s nuclear program, and flopped with every other major objective it had, including regime change?’.

“The fact is, Israel suffered an historic humiliation that has destroyed its mystique”. Gulf States will have some difficulty to digest the larger meaning to this symbolic occurrence.

And though Trump’s electorate seemingly is satisfied that America participated in the war minimally – and apparently is happy to reside cocooned in a miasma of exaggerated self-congratulation – there is significant evidence that the MAGA faction of the Trump coalition, simultaneously is reaching the conclusion that the U.S. president is increasingly becoming part of the Deep State system that he so ardently criticised.

There were two key issues in the last U.S. Presidential election: immigration and ‘no more forever wars’. Trump, today, despite highly confusing and contradictory massaging, is clear that a forever war is not off the table: “If Iran builds nuclear facilities again – then in that scenario – the U.S. will strike [again]”, Trump has warned.

That – and the increasingly bizarre posts that Trump pens – seem to have had the effect of radicalising the Populist base against Trump on this issue.

For the rest of the world, Trump’s recent postings are disturbing. Perhaps they work for some Americans, but not elsewhere. It means that Moscow, Beijing or Tehran find it harder to take such erratic messaging seriously. Equally troubling, however, is how divorced from geo-political reality, in a succession of cases, Team Trump has proved to be in their situation assessments. Amber lights are flashing in many capitals across the world.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/07/01/what-means-winning/

 

READ FROM TOP.

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

         Gus Leonisky

         POLITICAL CARTOONIST SINCE 1951.