It’s the biggest and most controversial Defence project in the country’s history with $368B worth of eggs put in the one basket. The Government would have you believe it’s all going well. Former project manager and submariner Rex Patrick serves up the truth.

In April 2024, MWM set out the high-level risks associated with the AUKUS nuclear submarine program; political, economic, technical and management, with the article delving into some of the risks already in play.

But with the project having passed its third birthday, it’s worth looking at the various stages of the plan on record to see how things are unfolding.

The first stage of the AUKUS sub program is the forward deployment of four US Navy submarines to operate out of HMAS Stirling in WA. This is likely to happen, but not without some considerable community pain.

In terms of infrastructure at HMAS Stirling to support the deployment, in June, Assistant Minister Andrew Leigh referred a $738M HMAS Stirling upgrade project to the Federal Parliament’s Joint Committee on Public Works, including upgraded berthing facilities, dredging for nuclear-powered submarines, construction of a Radiological Controls Technical Field Office, a radioactive waste facility, power stations (including for nuclear sub shore supplies) and a pure water processing plant.

This work was rubber-stamped by the Labor-Coalition controlled joint committee and will commence in 2026 and be completed in 2027. It’ll proceed without significant risk.

But there’s a huge problem that will only end up in pain and suffering. 

Defence estimates 700 new Australian AUKUS-related positions will be established over the coming few years, and an additional 700 US military personnel will move to WA. Defence has estimated an additional 500 houses will be required to meet US personnel needs.

Perth, like other major cities across Australia, is facing a housing crisis. In the last 12 months 15,000 new dwellings were constructed in Perth while the population increased by 94,000 – resulting in severe undersupply conditions.

Defence doesn’t seem to have a plan on record of how they intend to address these needs. The cash loaded AUKUS project team will likely solve this problem by simply outbidding the locals, denying everyday West Australians housing opportunities. Suffer the people.

The optimal pathway also has the United Kingdom operating one of the Royal Navy’s Astute Class nuclear subs out of HMAS Stirling from 2027.

Whatever advice Defence Minister Richard Marles is getting on this aspect of AUKUS, if it’s honest, it’ll start with the idiom, “Tell ‘em they’re dreaming”.

There have been periods over the last year where the Royal Navy has been unable to put any of its Astute subs to sea. The situation has improved over the past month, but there’s some very challenging problems arising from the run-down of the UK’s defence industrial base meaning low availability is likely to be a feature moving forward.

In the last week we’ve also heard the UK Government is considering mothballing the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers to ease their budget pressures. 

Britannia once ruled the waves, but that’s not been true for a century. Today’s Royal Navy is a shadow of its former self, barely hanging on to middle power status with little sustainable global power projection. One would have to bet against any consistent and sustained UK sub presence at HMAS Stirling in the years to come.

From around 2035 and beyond the Australian Government hopes that the US Navy will transfer between three and five Virginia class submarines to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Laws passed in the US Congress a year ago prohibit such transfers if they would have a negative outcome on US national security or foreign policy.

The US Navy currently has 49 nuclear attack submarines in service (with actual availability of subs in the low 30s). To meet their national needs, they need 66 subs by 2054. To meet that need, and the higher priority nuclear ballistic submarine requirements, and Australia’s AUKUS needs, they must have a production rate of at least 2.3 subs per annum. 

They’re nowhere near that target – since 2022 they’ve only been building somewhere between 1.1 and 1.4 boats per annum. This has resulted in a backlog.

To address their submarine industrial capacity shortfall the US Government is investing $US14.7B. Australia agreed to pour (a non-refundable) $US3B subsidy into US industry as well. But that total still falls well short of the $US28.4B the US Administration deemed was required for the work.

The construction dial is not moving. Talk of building a third US shipyard has evaporated, and the US Navy is only seeking funding for one Virginia class sub next year, recognising the impossibility of building two. 

Meanwhile, the US Government Audit Office has assessed the Columbia ballistic missile submarine program as running at least 12 months behind schedule and the US Navy is already planning and scheduling extension programs for a number of the Ohio Class submarines the Columbias are to replace. 

That nuclear deterrent program will get priority over AUKUS and US Virginia Class subs. And there’s talk that the US Navy might call for more ballistic missile subs, increasing pressure further.

abandon any nuclear submarine ambitions and instead purchase other defence capabilities

The US Congress is being advised that a more realistic proposition for Australia and AUKUS moving forward is for the number of US Navy subs based at HMAS Stirling to be increased from four to eight, with none transferred to the RAN. The highly respected Congressional Research Service is proposing we abandon any nuclear submarine ambitions and instead purchase other defence capabilities.

Vice Admiral Mead, the head of the Australian Submarine Agency, has buried his head in the sand in respect of the US not reaching 2.3 subs per annum, purporting to know more about US submarine construction than the US Navy itself. His blind faith, some say arrogance, on the issue has been apparent to all who watch Senate Estimates.

The crew of a Collins Class submarine is about 50. A force of six submarines means we need a theoretical 300 submariners, but in reality (considering training pipelines, sea-shore rosters, medical issues) we need about 800 submariners.

The crew of a nuclear-powered sub is about 140. Eight submarines would require a theoretical 1,120 submariners, but in reality, we’d need 3000 submariners; an increase of 2200 from current numbers.

But ADF numbers have been going down (they were about 4,400 below authorised levels mid-year) with no real sign Defence has any solid plan to get the numbers up generally, let alone to fill the more challenging roles such as submariner.

Documents released to MWM under FOI show that there are also problems building up the civilian nuclear workforce required for AUKUS. That’s another challenge for the Defence Department.

The Government spent $35M last financial year trying to negotiate a change to Article 14 of our Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to the Nuclear (weapon) Non-proliferation Treaty to allow us to take possession of nuclear-powered subs. $40M was allocated for FY 2024/5.

But there is resistance among the member countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with China stridently against Australia securing modification of Article 14. 

Many non-aligned members have little inclination to do Australia and the US any favours. Arms control and non-proliferation experts warn modifying nuclear safeguards to accommodate AUKUS would create a dangerous precedent whereby nuclear weapon States could transfer weapon-grade uranium to another country (e.g. Russia to Iran) via a submarine program.

There’s no guarantee that agreement will be reached and a failure to do so will bring the entire project crumbling down – neither the US nor the UK are prepared to transfer nuclear material to Australia without agreement being reached.

The Government seems, at least from the outside, to be oblivious to the risks. They’re adopting a ‘she’ll be right’ view.

I won’t bury the lede on the final item. The chance of the UK delivering its own SSN-AUKUS submarine to the Royal Navy on time is zero, nil, zilch. And that means the chance of an Australian-built SSN-AUKUS submarine being delivered on time is zero, nil, zilch.

The Royal Navy’s current order of battle would have Horatio Nelson turning in his grave and a generous description of the UK’s naval shipbuilding industry would be ”a basket case” – a national endeavour infested with delays and cost overruns.

Choosing the UK to design a next-generation submarine for Australia has to be the dumbest move by Australian Defence in recent memory. 

One might have thought the Government would have looked to the UK Hunter class frigate program we signed up to. It went from a very expensive $30B for 9 frigates to $45B for 9 frigates to $45B for 6 frigates. On top of this, the program is several years behind its original schedule, resulting in the Navy running a separate off-the-shelf construction program (called SEA 3000) with an undisclosed (but more likely unknown) budget.

The chance of an SSN-AUKUS project being continued by a future government must realistically be close to zero.

Risk, cost, loss of sovereign control; AUKUS is a mess.

But as far as the major party politicians in Canberra are concerned, it’s a project too big to fail. The Liberal/National Coalition came up with the idea and then the Labor Party swallowed it, hook, line and sinker.

No-one in Canberra, with the exception of Senator Shoebridge and Senator Lambie, are conducting any oversight of the project. There are very few adults in the room, but none with a real understanding of submarines. And that should have every Australian worried. 

Too big to fail? Folk once said something like that about a ship called ‘Titanic’.  

https://michaelwest.com.au/status-of-aukus-likely-outcome-us-operates-its-subs-from-base-australia/

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In the image at top: 

Richard Marles, UK Defence Secretary John Healey, and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III at the Old Royal Naval College, Greenwich UK.