Wednesday 27th of November 2024
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war is not about telling the truth, Scott... it's about making money...

The execution of a search warrant on my residence by the F.B.I. on Aug. 7 was not my first run-in with America’s premier law enforcement agency. 

In the 1990s, when I was working as chief weapons inspector for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) — set up by the U.N. Security Council to disarm Iraq as part of the ceasefire that ended the 1991 Gulf War — the F.B.I.’s National Security Division undertook an investigation premised on the working theory that I was committing espionage on behalf of the State of Israel. 

 

SCOTT RITTER: A Farewell to Truth

 

The keystone fact that held their case together was that I had, on multiple occasions, travelled to Israel for the purpose of turning over rolls of U-2 film for joint imagery interpretation work conducted by Israel photo interpreters and those of UNSCOM (including myself.)

The U.S. refused to give UNSCOM its own photo-interpretation capability, and would not allow UNSCOM into their photo-interpretation center to evaluate the U-2 imagery.

Israel had a significant amount of intelligence they wanted to share. Much of it couldn’t be shared without revealing sources and methods. The joint exploitation of imagery allowed the Israelis to release intelligence by claiming it was revealed through the evaluation of imagery, or that the imagery opened the door to share additional information. 

It was one of the most fruitful intelligence collaborations I was involved in, and the C.I.A. hated it because it took the control of  out of their hands of what, and where, UNSCOM inspected.

The U-2 film was the byproduct of what was known as “Olive Branch,” a program set up between the United States and UNSCOM in which a U-2 high-altitude surveillance aircraft, flown by a U.S. military pilot who had been designated as a U.N. “expert on mission.” 

The U-2’s classic black color scheme was an integral part of the integral heat and protective shield of the aircraft, and as such the airframe could not be painted in the traditional all-white color of United Nations aircraft on official missions. However, the aircraft was marked with a white “U.N.” on its tail.

The U-2 aircraft would only fly over Iraq with the permission of UNSCOM and would only image those areas inside Iraq designated by UNSCOM as being of interest. 

Under the terms of the official protocol agreed to by the U.S. and UNSCOM, the U.S. would provide UNSCOM with high quality prints, but not negatives, of the targets designated for collection by UNSCOM. These prints would be stored by UNSCOM using its own security arrangements.

In 1995 I participated in a meeting between UNSCOM and the C.I.A. where it was agreed that the C.I.A. would provide me with rolls of developed U-2 film which I would then transport to Israel for the express purpose of conducting joint imagery analysis with Israeli photo interpreters. 

During the initial mission, the Israelis wanted to make prints of the targets of interest that had been revealed by our joint work. To do this, however, the Israelis had to convert the roll of film into a negative. 

The protocol governing my work in Israel allowed me, as the expert on mission, to institute imagery handling procedures above and beyond those listed in the original protocol in consultation with the supporting government (i.e., Israel). As such, the Israelis and I agreed that they would make a negative copy of the film roll and use this to make prints of sites of interest to UNSCOM. 

The C.I.A. claimed Israel could use the U-2 imagery for planning purposes regarding air attacks on Iraq. But by the time the imagery got to Israel, it was already more than a month old. Plus, as Israel showed me, they had their own high resolution satellites which provided real-time coverage of sensitive targets in Iraq. Being able to print out a U-2 image meant Israel didn’t have to share top-secret satellite imagery.

Upon my departure from Israel, I was to bring with me the original roll of film, the negative copy and copies of any prints that had been made by the Israelis. I authorized the Israelis to keep a copy of the prints for their own records, in case there was a need to further consult on the images.

Upon my return to the United States, I travelled to Washington, D.C., where I arranged a meeting with the State Department’s Special Commission Support Office (SCSO). There I tried to return not only the original roll of film, but also the negative copy. 

I was told by the SCSO that they could receive the original roll of film, but that they were not permitted to take into custody the negative copy. I returned to UNSCOM with the negative copies. 

 

Storage Problem 

One of the problems I faced at the time was that my relationship with Israel was limited to only a few people inside UNSCOM. UNSCOM maintained a safe where we stored the high-quality U-2 prints provided by UNSCOM. 

However, the number of people who had access to this safe, including UNSCOM personnel from several different countries (including Russia) was significant, making my ability to store the negative copy roll in that safe impossible, since its presence would potentially compromise the Israeli cooperation. The same held true concerning the U-2 prints produced by Israel.

The solution was simple — I took the negative roll and Israeli prints home, where I stored them in a filing cabinet located in my basement.

I was originally brought to UNSCOM for the purpose of helping set up a U.N. intelligence unit capable of receiving and assessing intelligence information provided by supporting nations in support of our inspection work. Many nations provided such intelligence. 

The problem was UNSCOM needed to retain copies of this intelligence so that it could be properly assessed over the long term. The documents provided would either contain no classification markings or, if they did, would be appended with “release to UNSCOM.”

For the most part, these documents would be stored in the common UNSCOM safe. However, as the Iraqi efforts to conceal proscribed materials and activities intensified, and as the extent to which Iraq and its supporters among sympathetic nations (France comes to mind) infiltrated UNSCOM, intelligence information pertaining to missions that were planned as “no notice” surprise inspections had to be compartmentalized. 

I had tried to get the U.S. government to set up a safe house outside the U.N. Headquarters building where these materials could be stored and accessed by designated UNSCOM personnel, but the C.I.A. balked at the expense. 

As such, to prevent the contents of the sensitive planning documents pertaining to these no-notice inspections, I would take these documents home with me and store them in the file cabinet in my basement.

 

FBI Investigation

In 1997 the F.B.I. was informed that I was taking U-2 imagery to Israel. This imagery was marked “Secret Release UNSCOM,” but from the F.B.I.’s perspective, all they focused on was “Secret.”

They began an investigation.

At the time that the investigation began, I had implemented a covert communications intercept program inside Iraq which I oversaw in close coordination with the C.I.A. (which provided the equipment), the British GCHQ (which provided the personnel), and the Israeli Unit 8200, which provided the code-breaking and transcription.

Many of the reports generated by the Israelis were marked either “Secret” or “Top Secret.”

The nature of this operation was such that it was known to only a very small select number of UNSCOM personnel, which meant — you guessed it — documents produced in support this project and derived from this project were stored in the file cabinet in my basement.

The nature of this work required me to be in close contact with both the British MI-6 representative in New York, and designated Israeli personnel working out of the Israeli Mission to the United Nations. 

There were many days when I would literally shuttle between the Israeli and U.K. Missions, coordinating on urgent operational matters, and often stopping off at the U.S. Mission to coordinate with the C.I.A. liaison there. 

In June 1998, during a particularly hectic time, I was making my way from the U.K. Mission to the U.S. Mission when I was met by the C.I.A. liaison in the streets of New York City.

“I don’t want to meet you inside the Mission,” the C.I.A. liaison said. “The F.B.I. has a hard on for you and are getting ready to bring you in for questioning. They may grab you off the street tonight on your way home.”

This was, of course, disconcerting. 

“For what?” I asked.

“Spying for Israel. The F.B.I. thinks you’re handing over classified information to the Israelis.”

“Like what?”

“The U-2 film.”

“But you give it to me so I can take it to Israel. This makes no sense.”

The liaison agreed. “It is what it is. Where are you heading now?”

“The Israeli Mission.”

The C.I.A. liaison scanned the building surrounding our meeting place. “Great. Now the F.B.I. has me on film talking to you. Good luck!”

Later, in August, when I was preparing to resign from UNSCOM in protest over U.S. interference, the C.I.A. liaison officer invited me up to his working space, where he showed me a classified letter from the C.I.A.’s general counsel addressed to the F.B.I.

The gist of the letter was that since UNSCOM was an international organization staffed primarily by foreign nationals, the U.S. was prohibited from providing classified information to it. As such, by law, all documents and materials which were turned over by the U.S. government to UNSCOM became automatically declassified at the time they were received by UNSCOM. 

“That solves that,” the C.I.A. liaison said. “If the F.B.I. gives you any trouble, just reference this letter.”

“Can I have a copy?” I asked.

“It’s classified Secret,” he said. “I can’t give it to you for retention.”

Go figure.

The F.B.I. didn’t sweep me off the street, but thanks to CBS News, I became aware that the F.B.I. continued to investigate me for espionage even after I resigned from UNSCOM. The investigation was being run by David N. Kelley, the chief of the Organized Crime and Terrorism Division of the Southern District of New York. Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District, was overseeing the overall investigation.

The investigation continued for more than two years. Finally, after I agreed to be interviewed under what is known as “Queen for the Day” agreement, three F.B.I. agents conducted the interview, after which the Southern District informed me the matter had been dropped.

 

The Receipts

But I still retained the archive. When, in the summer of 1998, it became clear that the U.S. was undermining the work of UNSCOM, I began copying critical files, which would be used to document this interference. 

Most of these documents dealt with inspections and the planning that went into them, including the briefings that I had prepared for the UNSCOM executive chairman’s signature that outlined the goals and objectives of each mission.

I used these documents as sources for the various articles and books I wrote documenting the behavior of the U.S. government regarding Iraq and UNSCOM inspections. In the vernacular of today, these documents would be referred to as “receipts.”

I had the “receipts” which documented the lies of the U.S. when it came to their narrative that Iraq retained proscribed weapons of mass destruction.

I provided copies of many of these documents to Barton Gellman, The Washington Post reporter who wrote a detailed series of articles spelling out my claim that the U.S. was using UNSCOM to spy on Iraq. Initially the U.S. government took the position that I was lying. 

When Gellman informed them that he had the receipts, the U.S. government changed its tune, simply saying that I “lacked the context” to fully understand U.S. policy behind the actions I had documented.

Which was rich, since I had been with the U.S. government, side-by-side, implementing these policies, almost all of which were conceived by me and adopted after I briefed senior U.S. leadership of the need to implement them.

I had the receipts.

 

Article Distributed to Congress

I used these documents to write an article that was published in the June 2000 issue of Arms Control Today which was subsequently distributed to all members of Congress. As I previously wrote in an article published in TruthDig, then-Senator Joe Biden dispatched a senior member of the minority staff of the Foreign Relations Committee to meet with me. 

“This meeting,” I wrote, “was a singular disappointment. The staffer began by calling me a traitor for speaking out about Iraq and took umbrage when I backed up my claims with documents. ‘You are not supposed to have these materials,’ he said. ‘They are classified, and you are a traitor for publicizing the information they contain.’

“After reminding the staffer that he was walking a very dangerous line in calling a former officer of Marines a traitor, I pointed out that the information I cited was from my time as an inspector and was not classified in any way. 

No U.S. intelligence sources or methods were compromised by my efforts. While U.S. policymakers may have been embarrassed by my revelations, this was only because truth did not comport with the policies they were pursuing.

I reminded the staffer of Biden’s stated desire to call on my ‘knowledge and expertise in the future,’ [note: this desire was expressed in a personal letter written by Biden to me in September 1998, following his much-publicized clash with me during my testimony before the U.S. Senate] noting that this meeting was supposed to be conducted in keeping with that intent in mind.

“Senator Biden will not be meeting with you,” the staffer declared. “You’re too controversial.”

I slid the Arms Control Today article across the table. “How are facts controversial?” I asked. “Point to one thing in this article that you believe to be false or misleading.”

The staffer agreed that the article was fact-based, even if he disagreed with its conclusion. “But this isn’t about facts. This is about politics, and Senator Biden will not go against the policies of the Clinton administration, even if those policies are failing.”

I couldn’t think of a more damning indictment of a public official.

Between my resignation from UNSCOM in 1998, and up through the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, I wrote dozens of articles and opinion essays which were published in prestigious newspapers and magazines in the U.S. and around the world. 

All of these touched upon the issue of whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continued to possess weapons of mass destruction.

In every article and essay I wrote, I debunked the lies being peddled by the Bush administration claiming Iraq was a threat worthy of war because of its continued pursuit and possession of proscribed weapons.

Every article was unassailable in terms of its factual predicate.

Because I had the receipts.

One of the documents in my possession was the UNSCOM report on the debriefing of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law in August 1995, following his defection from Iraq. In it, Hussein Kamal stated that under his orders all weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991.

In August 2002, then-Vice President Dick Cheney told an audience of U.S. veterans that Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law had told the U.S. that Iraq had hidden its weapons of mass destruction from the U.N. 

“But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons,” Cheney said. “Among other sources, we’ve gotten this from the firsthand testimony from defectors — including Saddam’s own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam’s direction. Many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.”

I took the UNSCOM debriefing document to CNN, where they agreed to do a sit-down interview discussing its contents to contradict the false statement made by the vice president. But CNN was, at that time, a veritable tool of the U.S. government. 

After the interview was in the can, CNN informed the Bush White House that it would be running the story. The Bush administration convinced CNN to kill the story in the interests of national security.

But I had the receipts.

In early March 2003, on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, I made one last effort to get this information before the public. I reached out to John Barry, a reporter with Newsweek, and briefed him on the document’s existence. After he examined it and was assured of its authenticity, Barry wrote a piece which was published on March 3, 2003 — too late to stop the war.

But at least I had publicly put the lie to Dick Cheney’s claims.

Because I had the receipts.

I wrote a book that was published in 2005, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the U.N. and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. This book detailed the history of my work in UNSCOM disarming Iraq. The book is unassailable from a factual perspective, because in writing it I was able to draw upon by archive of documents.

My receipts.

I am in the process of finishing up a book provisionally titled The Scud Hunters, which details my experiences during the Gulf War and as an inspector in eliminating Iraq’s Scud missile force.

The book, if and when published, will be unassailable factually.

Because I have the receipts.

The F.B.I., in searching my home for personal electronics, visited my basement, where they encountered my file cabinet and its contents.

My archive.

The archive than enabled me to expose without fear of contradiction the lies told by the U.S. government and its agencies about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The senior F.B.I. agent approached me with the bad news. “We found a bunch of classified documents in your basement,” he said.

“They aren’t classified,” I replied. I explained to him the history of the documents and referred him to the C.I.A. general council’s letter about classified documents and UNSCOM.

The agent left, only to return. “The assistant U.S. attorney says that we cannot leave these documents in your possession until this matter is investigated further.”

“They aren’t classified,” I said. “You have no right to take them.”

“Well, we are going to take them. If what you say checks out, we will return them back to you.”

The F.B.I. left with some two dozen boxes containing the totality of my UNSCOM archive.

My receipts.

 

The Only Independent Record

The only record of the truth about UNSCOM’s work in Iraq disarming Iraq that isn’t controlled by the U.S. government, which continues to promulgate lies about the reasons it invaded Iraq.

Simply put, the F.B.I. seized the literal truth.

In the receipt provided to me, the F.B.I. simply wrote down “documents.”

There is no way the F.B.I. will be able to wrap its head around these documents. I spotted one of the senior F.B.I. agents walking around with several Vu-Graph slides I had made in support of a briefing I had prepared for a meeting in the White House Situation Room with the Deputies Committee where I would detail an inspection concept of operations targeting sensitive sites in downtown Baghdad. 

The White House had asked me to prepare a Power Point presentation, but that was beyond what I could do at UNSCOM. Instead, I took a bunch of maps, photos and diagrams to the local Kinko’s, where I slapped together a number of Vu-Graph’s. 

“The Kinko’s brief!,” I said as she walked past.

The look in her eyes underscored that she had no clue what I was talking about.

And therein lies the rub.

While I am confident I will not get into any trouble about the archive (how can I? It is unclassified), I do not have any confidence that the F.B.I. will return the documents.

The U.S. government simply cannot allow an archive such as this to exist “in the wild.”

They will find some excuse.

This archive isn’t just my personal collection of documents.

This is an archive of truth.

Indisputable fact.

A source of knowledge and information unique in the world which has served a very useful purpose — to expose the lies of the government.

I am a journalist — my record clearly reflects this reality.

And as such, I am part of what the Founding Fathers called “a free press.”

In his concurring opinion of the landmark 1971 Supreme Court decision, The New York Times v. The United States, Justice Hugo Black noted the following:

“The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of the government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.”

As wielded by me, my UNSCOM archive literally fulfilled its duty of helping me “bare the secrets of the government and inform the people” to prevent the government from “deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.”

By seizing this archive, the F.B.I. literally engaged in an act of censorship.

In seizing my archive, the F.B.I. invoked the notion of “national security.” But, as Justice Black noted, 

“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security.”

There can be no doubt that my UNSCOM archive did more than any other source of documented information to apprise the American people about the lies of their government when it came to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

And now it is gone.

 

Scott Ritter is a former U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in the former Soviet Union implementing arms control treaties, in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm and in Iraq overseeing the disarmament of WMD. His most recent book is Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika, published by Clarity Press.

 

https://consortiumnews.com/2024/08/16/scott-ritter-a-farewell-to-truth/

 

SEE ALSO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1zIyol0ybQ

WAR IS A CASH COW: Record 555% Shareholder Returns for Weapons Manufacturers as Peace is Sabotaged

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

 

war on credit....

 

Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex

 

William D. Hartung

 

Enthralling and explosive, Prophets of War is an exposé of America’s largest military contractor, Lockheed Martin. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his famous warning about the dangers of the military industrial complex, he never would have dreamed that a company could accumulate the kind of power and influence now wielded by this behemoth company.

As a full-service weapons maker, Lockheed Martin receives over $25 billion per year in Pentagon contracts. From aircraft and munitions, to the abysmal Star Wars missile defense program, to the spy satellites that the NSA has used to monitor Americans’ phone calls without their knowledge, Lockheed Martin’s reaches into all areas of US defense and American life. William Hartung’s meticulously researched history follows the company’s meteoric growth and explains how this arms industry giant has shaped US foreign policy for decades.

 

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/8632449-prophets-of-war

 

"The ideal set-up by the Party was something huge, terrible & glittering - a world of steel & concrete, of monstrous machines & terrifying weapons - a nation of warriors & fanatics, marching forward in perfect unity, all thinking the same thoughts & shouting the same slogans, perpetually working, fighting, triumphing, persecuting - three hundred million people, all with the same face."

George Orwell

1984

 

----------------------- 

 

How Much are You Making on the War, Daddy?

 

Columnist Paul Krugman has described Bush's melding of political hardball and economic favoritism as "crony capitalism," while Senator John McCain calls it war profiteering. George W. Bush's approach to military spending is a higher-priced version of what went on under the Suharto regime in Indonesia, when corporations connected to the military and the president's inner circle had the inside track on lucrative government contracts. The military budget has increased from 300 billion to more than 400 billion annually since George W. Bush took office. The Iraq invasion and occupation will cost at least another 200 billion over the next three to five years. U.S. policy is now based on what's good for Chevron, Halliburton, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Bechtel, not what's good for the average citizen. Dick Cheney's ties to conglomerate Halliburton are the tip of the iceberg since at least thirty-two top officials in the Bush administration served as executives or paid consultants to top weapons contractors before joining the administration. In George W. Bush's Washington, it has reached the point where you can't tell the generals from the arms lobbyists without a scorecard. This book provides that scorecard, in a style designed to provoke action for change.

https://www.amazon.com.au/How-Much-Making-Daddy-Administration/dp/1560255617

 

READ FROM TOP

 

YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

end the genocide.....

The United States is warning of a potential ecological disaster in the Red Sea following an attack by Yemen-based Houthi rebels on an oil tanker last week.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield said late Sunday the U.N. Security Council “must condemn” the Houthi attack on the MT Delta Sounion

“The Houthis’ brazen actions threaten to create an ecological disaster with devastating consequences for the region,” Thomas-Greenfield said on X.

She said the U.N. Security Council should demand immediate compliance with a January resolution calling on the Houthis to immediately stop attacking ships in the Red Sea.

The Iran-backed Houthis said Thursday they targeted the Greek-flagged tanker as part of their campaign against commercial shipping in the region in solidarity with the Palestinians amid the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

Rescuers evacuated the tanker’s crew following the attack, which left the ship in flames.

The European Union’s Red Sea naval mission Aspides said the tanker was carrying 150,000 metric tons of crude oil.

U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said Saturday that the Houthis “have made clear they are willing to destroy the fishing industry and regional ecosystems that Yemenis and other communities in the region rely on for their livelihoods, just as they have undermined the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to the region through their reckless attacks.”

The Houthi campaign has disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, prompting many shipping companies to reroute ships to longer and more expensive routes.

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-warns-of-ecological-disaster-after-houthi-attack-on-oil-tanker/7756926.html

 

DEPUTY PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY SABRINA SINGH:  Hi. All right. Good afternoon. I do not have that much at the top, so I'll be quick and then happy to jump in and take your questions. So, as you saw yesterday, US Central Command announced that the USS Abraham Lincoln, equipped with F-35C aircraft, entered the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

The movement of the ABE into the CENTCOM AOR was directed by Secretary Austin earlier this month as part of broad adjustments to US military posture in the region designed to improve US force protection, increase support for the defense of Israel, and to ensure the United States is prepared to respond to a various range of contingencies. Again, we remain focused on efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region and — while also remaining focused on securing a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal to bring all of the hostages home and to end the war in Gaza.

With that, happy to take your questions. Lita?

Q:  One quick follow on the Lincoln. It's crossed into CENTCOM, which means it's still out in the middle of the Indian Ocean though, correct?

MS. SINGH:  I don't have exact location. I wouldn't be able to give you the exact location of where she is. But she's in the Central Command AOR, and she will remain there.

Q:  I understand that, but that's — but she's still quite a ways from —

MS. SINGH:  For more on her movements, I'd refer you to CENTCOM. I don't have her exact location, but she is — she is in the AOR. And I'll just leave it at that.

Q:  And then secondly, the Greek ship that caught fire — that was attacked —

MS. SINGH:  Yeah.

Q:  And caught fire, the fire I think is out at this point. But do you know, is the US going to try to do anything, either through coordination or do something itself? Because there's — it's still loaded with fuel.

MS. SINGH:  So, what — just for awareness, what you're referring to is the Houthis launched an attack on a — on a vessel that was carrying approximately one million barrels of crude oil. I'm not — I know that the ship did catch fire. I don't know the status. What I would say is that, once again, the Houthis have attacked a ship that is carrying oil and that could likely spill into the Red Sea, creating an environmental disaster.

Also brings to question, you know, what exactly does this accomplish, seeing as how they said that they were launching these attacks to help the people of Gaza. Not exactly sure how that helps anyone in Gaza. And this was a — a Greek flagged ship that had a crew of Russian and Filipino sailors. So, not exactly sure their intention.

In terms of US response, you know that, through Operation Prosperity Guardian, we have ships in the — in that region that, you know, continue to defend and protect freedom of navigation. The US will assist where possible. But I believe another partnership was in the vicinity and was able to help assist getting crew off of that ship.

Q:  Right. The French got them off the ship. I'm talking about the impending environmental disaster.

MS. SINGH:  Yeah.

Q:  Is there any effort ongoing right now that you're aware of that the US is involved in to do something to mitigate what could be an environmental disaster there?

MS. SINGH:  At the moment, I think we're working with that — the private company, but I'm not aware of like — right now we are, you know, engaged in, you know, any environmental mitigation. This is something that we're going to work with — that private company on. But I'm not aware of anything else that we're doing at this moment. That — that's not to say that we won't in the future.

Yeah. Joe?

Q:  Thanks. Could you provide any updates on the Georgia submarine? Is it still in transit?

MS. SINGH:  The Georgia's still in transit. She's in the eastern Mediterranean. And when she chops into the Central Command area of responsibility, it'll be pretty noticeable. But, you know, we will — can let you know.

Q:  And then can I ask, on the force posture, the increased force posture in the region, it was presumably done in the aftermath of the Iranian threats and the threats from Hezbollah and others to retaliate against Israel. It's been a couple of weeks, I think. I don't know, two or three now. We haven't seen that retaliation.

Is it an open ended deployment of these increased — of this increased force posture or until an attack happens, or how is the Pentagon assessing how long these troops and these assets will be — will be there? Because some of these were taken out of the Indo-Pacific, which the department has said is the number one threat to US national security.

MS. SINGH:  So, in terms of a timeline, you know, I don't have anything to broadcast — in terms of how long the TR will stay in theater and how long the ABE will stay in theater.

But in terms of your question on, you know, timing of a potential response from Iran, you know, we've moved capabilities into the region that I think it's fair to say have gotten into the headspace of Iran and will influence their calculation on how and if they choose to respond. We don't want to see that happen, but we have two carrier strike groups there, each, you know, with four destroyers.

That sends a very powerful message of deterrence, and it also sends a message that, you know, we will stand with Israel should we need to come to their defense. But I can't — you know, I don't have a crystal ball to be able to forecast how long they're going to be — stay there, only that I can tell you is that we are — we are well postured should we need to come to the defense of Israel.

Q:  And just one last one. From what I could — what I tried to look up, the Secretary of defense hasn't had a single call with his Lebanese counterpart. I know the Joint Chiefs have spoken to the Lebanese army chief, but — throughout this and since I guess post-October 7th, and that's a key scene of what's going on in the region. Is there a reason? Is that — is that a — is that a reflection of what the department thinks of the current government?

MS. SINGH:  No, I don't — I don't think so. I don't have any calls to — to announce or read out. I think it's important to remember that the Secretary has calls with different — his — you know, a variety of counterparts in the — and it's not just from the Secretary, it's you know, the interagency that engage their counterparts at all different levels of government. Just because he hasn't doesn't mean that there aren't ongoing conversations at different levels of government. And as you know, whether it be Israel or Egypt or Qatar or any other country, you know, the Secretary has engaged over time. And, you know, recently, well, I guess it seems recently, but you know, it was in the — was in CENTCOM, you know, a few months ago and I'll just leave it at that. Great, I'm going to go Lucas and then I'll go to the phones.

Q:  Sabrina, do you support Ukraine's incursion into Russia?

MS. SINGH:  So we're supporting Ukraine in what they need on the battlefield right now. As you heard us say time and again, you know, we are — we are getting a better understanding of what the Ukrainians are doing in Kursk. Our policy does allow for them to engage in those counter fires, but we are still supporting Ukraine in what they need on the battlefield, and that is through different Presidential drawdown packages. That's not going to change.

Q:  You said something similar last week, that you're still trying to learn what they're doing. I think it's pretty obvious what they're doing. I think, for the whole world, it's obvious what they're doing. Why can't the Pentagon publicly support Ukraine's incursion into Russia?

MS. SINGH:  Well, Lucas, to respectfully push back on that, I would say that we have and are supportive of Ukraine broadly. This is —

Q:  — Not broadly. Why can't you specifically support this operation?

MS. SINGH:  Sure. So if you'd — let me finish. So when it comes to Kursk, we have an understanding from what President Zelenskyy laid out that they want to create a buffer zone. We are still working on with Ukraine on how that fits into their strategic objectives on the battlefield itself. When we feel confident that we have a better understanding of how that all knits together, you know, I'm happy to read out more. But right now, we're still working and still have some questions and we're getting that back. And the Secretary is going to engage again with Minister Umarov.

Q:  It's been two weeks.

MS. SINGH:  Yeah, I understand. These things take time.

Q:  And also one on the Houthis.

MS. SINGH:  Sure.

Q:  General Kurilla wants to destroy this group. Why won't you let him?

MS. SINGH:  Can you repeat that?

Q:  General Kurilla, head of US forces in the Middle East, CENTCOM commander, wants to destroy the Houthis. Why won't you let them do that?

MS. SINGH:  I think they're — you know, I'm not sure if you're referring to specific comments. I think General Kurilla is in lockstep with the Secretary on wanting to degrade the Houthis' capabilities to being able to do — to being able to disrupt shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the BaM. And General Kurilla has done an incredible job of bringing together and leading a coalition of like minded nations to degrade the Houthis' capabilities. And you're almost seeing them doing that on a daily basis and it actually has degraded the Houthis' capabilities.

Q:  These attacks keep happening. We now have an environmental disaster in the making. You said a million tons of oil is about to be dumped in the Red Sea. This is a big problem.

MS. SINGH:  Yeah, can I just say, like, 1 million potentially an environmental catastrophe of 1 million barrels of crude oil in the Houthis' backyard. That is an environmental disaster that they're going to have to deal with. And at the end of the day, you tell me what they say on how that gets to their strategic objectives because I'm not sure that I'm understanding that. I'm going to go to the phones and I'm happy to come back to the room. Jeff Schogol, Task and Purpose.

Q:  Hi. I came in late, so I'm really sorry if you've already addressed this. Is the Theodore Roosevelt still in the AOR, meaning there are two carrier groups in the AOR?

MS. SINGH:  That's correct, Jeff. There are two carriers in the AOR right now.

Q:  Thank you.

MS. SINGH:  OK, great. Heather, USNI.

Q:  Hi, Just to go on about the Sounion and environmental disaster. So at this point the Houthis have now created a couple different environmental disasters and sank a couple different ships. You know, in terms of degrading, when you're seeing them being able to do this after all the strikes that the US has done, do you think that the Pentagon has been successful in degrading the Houthis' capabilities?

MS. SINGH:  Yeah. Thanks, Heather, for the question. So the simple answer is yes. We have been successful in degrading their capabilities. They still maintain a robust arsenal, but we have been able to degrade their capabilities over time and we have been able to protect ships that transit the Red Sea with our alliance through Operation Prosperity Guardian.

So it's not for nothing. We still know that they maintain capabilities, but the fact that we have been able to do, you know, conduct dynamic strikes to prevent ships from being harmed, to prevent innocent sailors and mariners transiting that — that region, yes, they have gotten, you know, a few attacks through when it comes to some vessels transiting, but we've also been able to degrade their capabilities, and I think that is due in large part to the leadership of General Kurilla and, you know, the coalition that he's built with the Secretary as well of Operation Prosperity Guardian. I'll take one more from the phone and then happy to come back in the room. Lara Seligman, Wall Street Journal. Lara, are you there?

Q:  Hey. Sorry for that delay. Just unmuting myself. A couple questions following up on the Kursk incursion. First of all, what is DOD's understanding is the strategic goal of the Kursk incursion? And then secondly, has the use of US weapons in Kursk violated any US policies?

MS. SINGH:  Yeah. Thanks, Lara, for the question. In terms of their goals, I would direct you to what President Zelenskyy said a few days ago, which is, our understanding, is to create a buffer zone. We do have some more questions on that. We are trying to understand more on, you know, how that knits into their strategic objectives on the battlefield.

And in terms of your follow up, you know, our policy does allow for Ukraine to conduct counter fires to defend itself from Russian attacks coming over that border region. And that border region does include Kursk. It does include Sumy, and so they are defending themselves from Russian attacks within that region. All right, happy to come back in the room. Oren.

Q:  Two questions, one on Ukraine. When you're talking about a buffer zone and Ukraine tells you that's what they're creating or says openly that's what they're creating, is there a limit that you have placed on the Ukrainians on how big that buffer zone can be? How wide of a buffer zone are they going for?

MS. SINGH:  That's something that we continue to work with them on, on exactly what are their strategic objectives on creating that buffer zone and how — if they plan to expand. These are questions that we're continuing to ask. So I don't have an update for you right now.

Q:  So they haven't communicated to you here is — here is how far we're going with our buffer zone.

MS. SINGH:  Not to my knowledge.

Q:  And then on the Abraham Lincoln, Secretary Austin had ordered it to accelerate. It's now in the AOR. What was its original arrival date supposed to be and how much time did the acceleration cut off? How much faster did it get there?

MS. SINGH:  Yeah. So I'm not going to get into timelines and specific dates, but what I can tell you is that in transit, INDOPACOM had set up a few stops that were in the pre-planning phase that the ABE was going to engage on and those were pulled down so that she could have an expedited in-shop into Central Command. Goyal.

Q:  Thank you, madam. Two questions, please. One, tomorrow morning, Defense Secretary, of course, will be welcoming the defense Minister of India, Mr. Rajnath Singh. So much going on in the region in South China Sea and all the conflicts going on in Bangladesh, conflicts going on in Pakistan, and also China's expansion in the region going on. So what do we have new now between the US and India military to military relations when Secretary Lloyd Austin welcome him tomorrow here at the Pentagon?

MS. SINGH:  So as you mentioned, it's happening tomorrow, so I'm not going to get ahead of the Secretary. We will have a readout. There will be a range of issues discussed. I have no doubt they will be discussing the close coordination and partnership when it comes to the Indo-Pacific and, you know, our shared goals of maintaining and keeping a free and open Indo-Pacific. But you know, I'm just not going to get ahead of the Secretary. And once that meeting concludes, we will have a readout.

Q:  Before my second question, how — the two leaders are getting together. Have they known each other very well as far as relations are concerned? And how the military to military relations between the US and India are standing today?

MS. SINGH:  I — you know, the mil to mil relationships between the United States and India are strong. You've seen that cooperation deepen, and not just from a DOD perspective, but from an administration perspective. You know, our close coordination and, you know, working together remains strong and you saw, you know, the Secretary when he visited India, you know, announced some of those deliverables.

I'm not going to go through all of what he announced then, but it remains strong and I'm not — I'm just not going to get ahead of the meeting that's happening tomorrow, but we will have a readout after that meeting. I'm going to come over here. I'm just going to — I'm going to jump over here, Luis, and then over to you. Yeah.

Q:  Hi. First, on Ukraine, earlier this week General Ryder said that the indications were that a small number of Russian forces were moving into Kursk. Is that still the same guidance or can you amplify that just a little bit more and, you know, give us some information about where these forces are coming from? Are they sizable enough to potentially push back?

MS. SINGH:  So I can't get into more details right now on, you know, the size and how many — you know, how Russia is repositioning some of their forces. We know that there has been some movement, but I just — I can't get into details on, you know, what that — more specifics on what that looks like.

Q:  And as you strive to get more indications, you know, of the strategic purpose, are you seeing the Ukrainians digging in to try to hold those positions that they've seized so far, or does it seem more like they continue to be on the broader offensive?

MS. SINGH:  Well, that's actually some of our, you know, questions that we have for Ukraine. Is their intention to continue to hold, or how — you know, when they say they're creating a buffer zone, and to Oren's question of, you know, how large are they going to expand, these are some of the questions that we're asking. Because if they are going to create a buffer zone, that does entail creating, you know, multiple defensive lines. And so, those are questions that we're working through with them.

I don't have all those answers right now, but that's something that — you know, the Secretary is going to engage Minister Umerov again in the coming days. When we have more to share, you know, we certainly will. But I think it's important that, you know, Ukraine also speak to their operations, and Ukraine should really speak to their objectives and goals. And that's still something that we're trying to learn from them, on how this fits into their strategic operations.

It's important that — you know, our support for Ukraine is still unwavering. We're still going to have PDA packages that come out from this building. I don't have one for — to announce today, if that was going to be your follow up. But, you know, we are going to continue to support Ukraine in — in their fight and whatever they need to be successful.

Q: So, my follow up —

MS. SINGH:  Uh-huh.

Q:  Is actually going to be a follow up to Joseph's point —

MS. SINGH:  Okay.

Q:  From earlier about our preparation — preparing, the change the force posture —

MS. SINGH:   Yeah.

Q:  For potential retaliation from Iran. That hasn't happened. It's been almost three weeks now. Do you see a correlation between any lack of action there and the new Iranian government, you know, essentially trying to determine its path forward?

MS. SINGH:  So, I can't — you know, I can't really speculate on that and the new government that's forming. I think that, by surging capabilities into the region, by having two carriers in the Central Command — or in CENTCOM, by moving destroyers closer to Israel, should they need to be called to the defense of Israel, you know, the announcement of the Georgia as well, having a squadron of F-22s also in the region, I think that gets into the headspace of Iran. And I think that gets into — you know, they see us positioning should we need to support Israel, I'm sure that gets to their calculation.

What that, you know, means for them at the end of the day, that I can't speak to. And their new government, as you mentioned, I can't really speak to that. I can just speak to our movements, and, you know, it — we are messaging that we are there to deter and that, of course, we are there to protect our forces and if needed to come to the defense of Israel.

Yes, sir?

Q:  Thank you very much for the opportunity. A couple of questions. Before that, if you allow me, I have someone to introduce you, Mr. Mughal, a Pakistani journalist. He's been in Russia and the United Kingdom, reported many political events and other things. Now he is joining us from here.

So, the question is regarding the top Iraqi official visited this week Pakistan and held meetings with Pakistani military officials. And it's been reported from July that Pakistan and Iraq both comes to an agreement of $1.8 billion for the 12 units of Mushshak training jets. And now there are — they are in talks regarding JF-17 fighter aircraft that China and Pakistan initially produced.

So, at the same time when US is considering its troop withdrawal from Iraq and Iraqi military is considering to get some Chinese technology from Pakistan, is there any concern from US? Are you are aware on this?

MS. SINGH:  I don't really have a comment to offer on — unfortunately, I just — I don't have a lot to offer on what you're asking right now. What I can tell you is that, when it comes to our relationship with Iraq, the HMC conversations are ongoing. We are moving towards a bilateral security agreement. When we have more to announce on that, we certainly will. But I just don't have more for you today on that.

Q:  So, about the USS Abraham Lincoln that just arrived in Middle East with F-35 fleet —

MS. SINGH:  Um-hmm.

Q:  So is there also something in the consultation with the US to address your Arab allies security from there specifically? Because we are aware that, like, USA and Saudi Arabia both are in talks for defense deal, and Saudi Arabia are continuously asking for defense shortage from the US. So, in the context of Iran retaliating to Israel, is there something, consideration as well, for the Saudi context to secure their interest with this placement?

MS. SINGH:  I don't have anything in terms of the — you know, I think Saudi should speak for their own government and their own decisions. Our decisions are made on, you know, what the Secretary deems is needed for the region and working with General Kurilla and others to ensure that, one, of course we're always taking into consideration protection for our forces in the region.

Two, we do not want to see — we know that tensions are high. We want to see a de-escalation of tensions in the region. Three, we're also sending a message that, you know, should we need to do what we did on April 13th, we are even better positioned than we were then to come to the defense of Israel.

Again, we don't want to see it get to that level. We want to see tensions deescalate. And the best way for us to see that happen is through, you know, seeing the ceasefire deal come to fruition. You know, our teams are working hard over there right now to see that be put into place, and we want to see the hostages come home.

Q:  Just a little on the High Level Military Commission you've — in the — Iraq. So, with the ongoing possible Iranian retaliation, is there any changing about the US troop withdrawal talks or something that was in process, something in consideration?

MS. SINGH:  The HMC conversations and dialogs continue. I'm not going to speculate on what a future attack could do to those — to those conversations.

Yes?

Q:  Yeah. Thanks so much. A few days ago, General Ryder said that, if we see any real threats from ISIS based in Afghanistan, we will take an action. So, the Taliban officials claimed that they eliminated all Daesh or ISIS in Afghanistan. My question is that — are the Taliban a partner with the Pentagon or with the US government in terms of fighting Daesh or ISIS?

MS. SINGH:  So, the US has a global coalition to defeat ISIS. The Taliban is not part of that. The US works with like-minded partners and allies when it comes to the — to ensuring the defeat of ISIS. I don't have more for you on to — anything additional to offer.

I'm going to go to Konstantin over here. Yeah.

Q:  Thanks. Thanks, Sabrina. CNN is reporting that the Army is looking to contract some boats to take three of the Army JLOTS ships back to the United States. Can you speak to why this — this is necessary?

MS. SINGH:  I would refer you to Army. I don't have anything on that.

Q:  Thank you.

MS. SINGH:  Yeah, Noah.

Q:  Can you give the JLOTS update more broadly —

MS. SINGH: Sure.

Q:  Specifically where the aid is that was left to be delivered?

MS. SINGH:  Sure. So, in terms of JLOTS, I think I read out, maybe it was last week, but we do have some of our soldiers and sailors that have returned back CONUS. We still have about six million pounds of aid that remains on the Cape Trinity.

The Cape Trinity just recently left Cyprus and is moving towards Ashdod. We're hoping within the next couple of days you're going to see aid roll off the Cape Trinity, and then when that happens, the Cape Trinity would be, you know, redeployed. But that's our latest update.

Q:  Thank you.

MS. SINGH:  Jim?

Q:  Back to Ukraine, so have you guys seen that the Russians, are they pulling folks out of the Donbas? Because that — that offensive is still going on. And is the — is the Kursk operation having any effect at all on the Donbas?

MS. SINGH:  So, you know, in terms of where Russians are repositioning some of their troops from, I can't really speak to that. We know that there has been some movement. But, you know, really that's not for us to speak to.

I think when it comes to your second question, it remains to be seen how Kursk impacts the east. That's something that — you know, we're still trying to get a better understanding from the Ukrainians on the long term goals in the region or in that — in that area, and also understanding how that fits into their strategic operations. So, you know, that's still something that we're working through, and I just don't — I just don't have that answer for you on how that impacts the east just yet because I don't think we know.

Q:  Is that one of the things that the Secretary is asking his counterpart?

MS. SINGH:  I won't go beyond the readout. But you can believe that the Secretary is asking a lot of questions.

Yes, one here and then I'll go to Liz.

Q:  Thank you very much, Sabrina. Russian President Vladimir Putin has visited Chechnya after 13 years. How do you see this visit, especially in context of Ukraine advancing into Russian territory? Is it a back step of Russia, or is it a victory of US led Western Bloc military strategy that — a Chechnya group had been supporting Russian army, so President Vladimir Putin has visited after 13 years. So, is Russia on the back foot right now?

MS. SINGH:  You know, I think you're seeing Russia continue to recruit and amass a force, and you know, they have that ability to do that. I can't really speak to this visit, I'm sorry, I just don't know enough about it to really comment on it, but what I can tell you is what we're doing. And what we're doing is supporting Ukraine and you have, you know, the Secretary leading the Ukraine defense contact group almost monthly. You have 50 nations coming together to support Ukraine. So that stands in contrast to some of the friends that Russia is turning to when it comes to procuring either security assistance or you know whatever it might be. That stands in strong contrast to, you know, the 50 countries and like -minded nations that are supporting Ukraine every single day in their battlefield needs. Liz, last one.

Q:  Thanks, Sabrina.

MS. SINGH:  We have Liz and Lucas in the room today with questions.

Q:  Yeah. Moving back to the Houthis, why does the US not have a larger presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden? Because the Houthis are still having successful attacks.

MS. SINGH:  So I wouldn't say that we don't have a presence. We still maintain a presence in the region. And it doesn't — just because the United States not — might not have a destroyer in the Red Sea doesn't mean that we don't have other partners operating there that are either part of Operation Prosperity Guardian or operating on their own.

So I think it's important to remember that this is a global coalition and it is a global problem, and it's not just the United States that is there to defend shipping lanes and to ensure freedom of navigation. It is on all of us and that's what you're seeing, you know, other countries come to the rescue and support of crews who you know were hit by the Houthis. You know earlier this morning, another country ship helped rescue that crew. So the United States will always adjust its force posture there, but just because we don't necessarily have a presence in like in that specific strait doesn't mean that one of our partners or allies doesn't.

Q:  Thanks. Just a quick follow up, since these attacks are still continuing and the US hasn't been able to deter the Iran backed Houthis, how is the US supposed to deter this potential attack from Iran on Israel?

MS. SINGH:  And yet, I just got questions about why hasn't Iran attacked yet and, you know, I would almost say is almost — is deterrence working? You know, I can't speak for Iran. The Houthis continue to engage in their, you know, unlawful attacks against innocent mariners. I'm not exactly sure how hitting a ship carrying over a million barrels of crude oil and creating, you know, a spill in your backyard helps people in Gaza who you said you're trying to help. I'm not sure how that that works.

Also I think this — this vessel was leaving from Iraq and was a Greek — a Greek flagged ship. So again, not sure how that plays into your broader strategic objectives. And then, you know, on top of that, what does that accomplish? You sunk a ship in your back yard and now you have potentially an environmental disaster.

We're going to continue to hold the Houthis accountable. You see us do that. You know, CENTCOM puts out, you know, pretty regular updates on when we engage. Our commitment is there through Operation Prosperity Guardian. We're going to continue to engage where appropriate. And then, of course, when it comes to Iran, we have two carriers in the region. We have a squadron of F-22s. I think that sends a really powerful message, but I can't get into to more than that. Yes.

Q:  I just want to follow up on that question. Why not strike the launchers? I mean, at the end of the day it's driven so much global trade out, you know, there's going to be extra costs that are going to be reflected in the economy over this. At what point do you need to escalate strikes on the missile launchers themselves to try to establish perhaps a little bit more deterrence, a little bit more order to the questions that have been kind of going around on that?

MS. SINGH:  You're talking about the Houthis?

Q:  Correct.

MS. SINGH:  We have struck missile launchers.

Q:  I understand that, but it doesn't really — it doesn't seem to have attenuated anything that the Houthis at this point are doing, and yet they keep imposing costs. And these sort of drip drop attacks are driving more shipping out of that, right? I mean, their whole goal is to create as much disruption as possible, even if they take environmental damage at the end of it. I mean, is there some calculus, some metric that attacks get to X amount and we would respond in a more forceful manner to send maybe a clearer deterrent?

MS. SINGH:  I think every single day that we respond and we blow something up that they are about to launch does send a forceful message. And even though it, you know, even though they continue to launch their attacks, we are still degrading their capabilities and every single day that they launch attacks, they're not always successful. They're not always hitting a ship, they're not always — you know, their intentions, while you know, can't get into their mindset, they're not always achieving their goals. And sometimes you know, things are landing, you know, miles and miles away from their intended target.

So what is also their objective and their goals at the end of the day? To your question on the launchers, I mean from looking at some of the strikes we've done, we've hit over 150 launchers. We're going to continue to take the actions that we need to protect commercial shipping, to protect our forces in the region, and we're just going to continue to do that day in and day out.

Q:  Bottom line, Sabrina, this does not appear —

MS. SINGH:  — I'm going to go to Mike, and then I'm going to wrap up.

Q:  It just does not appear that this international coalition is finding success against the Houthis. These attacks keep happening.

MS. SINGH:  I would actually push back on that and say it doesn't appear that the attacks that the Houthis are launching, be it every single day, every other day, every few days, are actually meeting their intended targets. They just created an environmental disaster right outside their own home country. Like, what purpose does that serve? That is going to have lasting impacts. And they've done that before. I mean, what kind of impact does that have for the region?

Q:  Their goal is to degrade shipping, and they're doing it.

MS. SINGH:  So I'll just — one more on this. They — while they continue to launch attacks, we have ensured that shipping has continued through those shipping lanes. We want to see it. We want to see it protected. That's why you have Operation Prosperity Guardian. We're going to continue to do our jobs and we'll leave it at that. Mike, and then we'll wrap up.

Q:  The British MOD said the Russians have been forced to create ad hoc infantry units out of support personnel and air force units to engage the Ukrainians in the Kursk region. Can the Pentagon confirm that, and what does that say about the Russians ability to oppose Ukraine, the fact that they don't have enough, apparently, main line infantry units?

MS. SINGH:  I can't confirm those reports. I haven't — I haven't seen what you're referencing. This is something that we are talking to the Ukrainians about, about what their long term objectives are in Kursk and you know creating that buffer zone. What that means in terms of their own, you know, commitment in military power, how much they're going to need for that region, that's something that we're continuing to work with them on.

OK, thanks, everyone.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3882144/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/

 

Joint Statement From Australia, Bahrain, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States on Additional Strikes Against the Houthis in Yemen Feb. 24, 2024 |  

In response to the Houthis' continued attacks against commercial and naval vessels transiting the Red Sea and surrounding waterways, today the militaries of the United States and United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, conducted an additional round of strikes against several targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.

Today's necessary and proportionate strikes specifically targeted 18 Houthi targets across 8 locations in Yemen associated with Houthi underground weapons storage facilities, missile storage facilities, one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, air defense systems, radars, and a helicopter. These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade, naval vessels, and the lives of innocent mariners in one of the world's most critical waterways.

These strikes are in response to Houthis' continued attacks against commercial and naval vessels that have not only endangered international seafarers but the lives of the Yemeni people, including the February 22 missile attack that struck the United Kingdom-owned M/V Islander and injured a crewmember, the February 19 missile attack that nearly struck the U.S.-owned M/V Sea Champion while delivering humanitarian aid to Yemen, the February 19 UAV attack that struck the U.S.-owned M/V Navis Fortuna, and the February 18 missile attack that struck the United Kingdom-owned M/V Rubymar and forced the crew to abandon the ship.

The Houthis' now more than 45 attacks on commercial and naval vessels since mid-November constitute a threat to the global economy, as well as regional security and stability, and demand an international response. Our coalition of likeminded countries remains committed to protecting freedom of navigation and international commerce and holding the Houthis accountable for their illegal and unjustifiable attacks on commercial shipping and naval vessels.

Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea, but we will once again reiterate our warning to Houthi leadership: we will not hesitate to continue to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in the face of continued threats.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3686190/joint-statement-from-australia-bahrain-denmark-canada-the-netherlands-new-zeala/

 

SOLUTION: END THE ISRAHELLI WAR ON GAZA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST.... STOP SUPPLYING ISRAHELL WITH BOMBS.

 

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