After the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on Tuesday, Iran promised a "harsh punishment" for Israel. On Wednesday, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin declared that the United States was ready to defend Israel in the event of an attack by Iran.

US Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced legislation right before the Congress recess in August that would authorize President Joe Biden to use military force against Iran if he determines that Iran has capabilities that threaten the national security interests of the United States.

“The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against the Islamic Republic of Iran if the President determines that the Islamic Republic of Iran–

1) Is in the process of possessing a nuclear weapon that threatens the national security interests of the United States; or

2) Possesses uranium enriched to weapons-grade level, possesses a nuclear warhead, or possesses a delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that threatens the national security interests of the United States.”

While the bill specifies that it is limited to Iran’s nuclear program, it is broad enough to potentially authorize Biden to strike Iran as soon as the bill passes. While Iran is not believed to possess a nuclear warhead, it already has an arsenal of missiles that would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead if Iran were to obtain one. Biden seemingly would be authorized by the bill to strike Iran if he determines that to be a threat.

The same day, Graham also introduced a bill that would affirm any “escalation by Hezbollah” will be seen as an escalation by Iran and urges Congress and the President “to use all diplomatic tools and power projection capabilities to hold both parties accountable for their actions,” but stop short of specifically authorizing military force.

On Thursday, Graham posted on X that "it is long past time to start talking about offense when it comes to Iranian threats against Israel, the United States, and the world."

Both bills come as tensions are rising between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel and Iran and Israel. Earlier this week, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran and Hezbollah leader Fouad Shukur was killed in an Israeli airstrike in southern Beirut.

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https://sputnikglobe.com/20240802/us-sen-graham-introduces-bill-authorizing-military-force-in-iran-1119600931.html

WARMONGERS, LIKE GRAHAM, HAVE NO BRAINS.... SEND THEM TO THE FRONT LINES WITH A POP GUN...

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

Three assassinations across three territories: What we know about Israel's targeted strikes on its enemies

By Ben Knight and Esther Linder with wires

The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh should have been all but impossible.

He was an honoured guest of the Iranian government, protected by its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and staying in a secure safe house in the heart of Tehran.

Yet at least three international news publications are reporting the explosion that killed Ismail Haniyeh came not from an air strike but from a bomb planted in Haniyeh's apartment potentially weeks before his arrival, and detonated remotely.

The explosion killed Haniyeh and his bodyguard on July 31 around 2am local time.

The New York Times, Axios, and the Wall Street Journal have all reported that the Tehran assassination involved a bomb planted weeks — or even months — ahead of Haniyeh's arrival in the Iranian capital for the inauguration of the country's new president.

The reports say the bomb was planted and detonated based on intimate knowledge of the secure compound — knowing not only which room Haniyeh was staying in, but when he was in it.

f so, it's a stunning and humiliating failure for the Iranian security authorities, and the Revolutionary Guards in particular.

"The targeted killings of Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran this week do not represent a new methodology for Israel since they have carried out similar operations for decades," former senior US government counterterrorism official and associate professor at the University of Michigan, Javed Ali, told the ABC.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also claimed an IDF strike in Gaza on July 13 killed Hamas's military leader, Mohammed Deif.

His death has not been confirmed by Hamas.

The timing of the three assassinations so close to one another was significant, he said.

Although the damage to the Tehran building is covered by a green screen, it looks markedly different to the aftermath of the air strike on an apartment in Beirut on Tuesday that killed Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr — where Reuters footage showed a multi-storey building that appeared to have a top corner sheared off.

The strike also killed three civilians, including two children.

"The first couple of seconds you don't understand or comprehend what's happening," a Beirut resident told Reuters.

"But then I knew that it was Israel, a bomb from Israel."

The IDF claimed responsibility for the air strike in Beirut, but not for the Tehran assassination.

However, comments by Israeli military spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stopped short of an outright denial.

"There was no additional air strike, not a missile and not an Israeli drone, in the entire Middle East that night," he said.

Even though Israel has not claimed responsibility for the Tehran attack on the Hamas leader, it's the obvious suspect.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-02/three-assassinations-israel-iran-lebanon-gaza/104175598

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BY Abdaljawad Omar

Israel's assassination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders is not intended to weaken the resistance. Its real objective is to restore the image of its military superiority and its intelligence services in the eyes of the Israeli public.

On the night of July 30, Israel intensified its military operations, targeting its adversaries on several fronts, including Lebanon, Iran and Palestine. The Israeli government claimed a significant success with the assassination of a Hezbollah commander in a densely populated neighborhood in southern Beirut. Simultaneously, Israel launched a daring strike into the heart of Tehran, killing Ismail Haniyeh, the acting head of Hamas' political bureau.

After ten months of slowly but steadily losing the escalation control it had maintained for decades, Israel is now trying to regain the initiative and reestablish the advantage by targeting both Beirut and Tehran in less time of 24 hours.

Israel's actions are not just about projecting strength; they are also designed to increase the pressure on the resistance axis. The strategic objective is to shatter the unity of this coalition by leveraging its military capabilities to flirt with the prospect of all-out war – an outcome that neither Israel, nor Hezbollah, nor, by extension, Iran, really don't want to. This brinkmanship aims to destabilize adversaries, force them to reconsider their unified position and, possibly, make concessions in favor of Israel.

Israel is banking on the idea that fear of further escalation will push Hezbollah and Iran to pressure Hamas to meet some of Israel's demands during ceasefire negotiations. Furthermore, Israel anticipates that any actual escalation – particularly that provoked by its targeted actions – would require the US and its allies to offer military and diplomatic support. Even if Washington is not actively seeking a major conflict, Israel is confident that the United States will not hesitate to come to its aid if the situation worsens. In other words, Israel is pursuing a policy of enmeshment and, in doing so, taking calculated risks, knowing that if things go wrong, the US military will rush to its defense in a new war in the Middle East.

For some time, Israel has been gauging the reactions of its adversaries, noting in particular the weak reaction of Palestinians to its proclamations that it had succeeded in assassinating Hamas' military commander in Gaza, Mohammed Al-Deif. This observation led Israeli strategic planners to conclude that while a diplomatic agreement remains a priority, such targeted assassinations are unlikely to derail those efforts.

Furthermore, Israel's calculations suggest that while Hezbollah and Iran may view incursions into Beirut or Tehran as significant escalations requiring a response, both actors are likely to avoid triggering an all-out conflict that could lead to open war. This belief underscores Israel's confidence in its ability to carry out targeted actions without provoking a broader regional conflict.

These maneuvers would likely have taken place independently of the Majdal Shams incident. The current operations and series of escalations come at a time when Israel stands to gain strategically, even if it eventually signs a deal. By accumulating tactical successes, Israel aims to reaffirm its dominance in terms of escalation in the conflicts between it and its adversaries. This approach reflects a calculated effort to strengthen its negotiating position while ensuring it maintains a decisive advantage in any potential confrontation. It also seeks to demonstrate its resilience and will to fight, even though the war has dragged on for months, with signs of fractures within Israeli society and a loss of confidence in the army. This situation culminated recently with riots outside the notorious Sde Teiman prison, protesting the detention of nine Israeli soldiers accused of gang-raping a Palestinian prisoner.

The notion of assassination is deeply rooted in the history of the Arab region, with the term itself originating from the region. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, in the turmoil of the Crusades, the Ismailis of Nizari – commonly known as “Hashashiyyin” – used assassination as a strategic tool to eliminate leaders who opposed their cause. However, the significance of the assassination in the region goes far beyond simple etymology. This region, long subject to colonial encroachment and artificially induced disunity, has become a theater where the conventional rules of war can be suspended. In this context, political actors who do not align with Western hegemonic interests are often seen as exceptions, making their leaders legitimate targets, in violation of the rules and norms in force elsewhere.

Over the past century, Israel has refined the practice of targeted assassinations, often combined with the arrest of key leaders, to eliminate influential political and military figures. This strategy aims not only to neutralize immediate threats, but also to shape the composition and character of the resistance it faces in the region. Through these deadly interventions, Israel seeks to cultivate a ruling class in Palestine and the broader Arab world that aligns more closely with US and Israeli interests, thereby manipulating the dynamics of resistance against its land-grabbing policies. , ethnic cleansing and colonization.

These tactics have proven effective in sidelining key Palestinian leaders at critical moments in the struggle. For example, in the years before Oslo, the assassination of central figures such as Yasser Arafat's second and third commanders – Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) and Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) – paved the way for emergence of a more flexible leadership, embodied today by Mahmoud Abbas.

During the Second Intifada, Israel arrested former Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti and PFLP Secretary General Ahmad Saadat. He may also have poisoned Yasser Arafat and assassinated PFLP military commander Abu Ali Mustafa, as well as key Hamas figures such as Abdulaziz Rantissi and Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin, to ensure that no real opposition to the entrenchment of the Palestinian comprador class can dominate Palestinian politics. Through these operations, Israel sought to reshape the consciousness of the ruling class that opposed it. After all, if the Palestinians, Arabs or their leaders abandon the cause, there will be no cause to speak of. The new leaders would not only fear for their lives, but also be more supportive of Israeli goals and objectives.

This policy has served Israel well in the past, but it has also had unintended consequences. Today, Palestinian disunity is not the result of a specific coalition or political group; it is a disunity marked by a pragmatic comprador class ruling the West Bank, while more homogeneous resistance groups operate from places such as Gaza. While the PLO once integrated diverse currents, such as the position of Mahmoud Abbas, into its organizational fabric, the current arrangement of resistance groups contains less disagreement over strategies to adopt toward Israel. The differences that exist within the resistance are essentially tactical or linked to the choice of alliance systems. In other words, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh does not automatically lead to the emergence of a more docile leadership in his place, because the movement from which Haniyeh emerged remains united around the framework of resistance.

Furthermore, Israel's rejection and refusal to welcome figures like Mahmoud Abbas, or to grant the Palestinians even a Bantustan state, has shaped Palestinian consciousness in a way that reinforces the belief which only resistance can bring about strategic changes. This attitude has been reinforced by the fact that negotiations are futile with an Israeli society that is both arrogant and supremacist, as recently shown by the riots during the Sde Teiman demonstrations for the right to rape Palestinian prisoners.

Israel's fear of making peace, its insistence on maintaining its rule through force, and the ironic presence of figures like Mahmoud Abbas, who, by allowing Israeli settlement in the West Bank without resistance, have driven Palestinians and resistance groups Palestinians to reject any serious approach towards negotiated solutions. This dynamic has reinforced the conviction that meaningful change cannot be achieved through dialogue with a state that continues to prioritize force and hegemony over genuine peace efforts.

Furthermore, Palestinians have both reframed their resistance and institutionalized its organizational structures. The character of these organizations has evolved, becoming less dependent on a cult of personality or deep emotional ties to individual leaders, and more focused on organizational roles and operational effectiveness. Gone are the days when resistance groups collapsed into disorder after the loss of a key figure.

Today, Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements have adapted to reality: the assassination of a prominent leader may result in a tactical setback, but does not lead to the disintegration of their operations. In fact, in many cases these groups have demonstrated resilience, using these incidents as a catalyst to consolidate and strengthen their organizational structures. This development reflects the maturation of resistance movements, where the emphasis is on sustainability and continuity rather than on the influence of individual leaders or specific clientelist networks wishing to establish their influence within a specific political formation .

Beyond the immediate tactical impact, what are the results of these assassinations? In some cases, they can turn against their perpetrators, as we saw with the assassination of Hezbollah leader Abbas Mussaoui, which paved the way for the rise of Hassan Nasrallah. In other cases, these actions may even facilitate the emergence of more innovative and adaptable commanders capable of occupying key positions. By eliminating one leader, Israel may unwittingly create space for the emergence of another, often more formidable, leader. It is enough to observe the evolution of Hamas and Hezbollah following various assassinations at different stages of history to realize that these operations have lost a large part of their effectiveness.

These assassinations strengthen the link between political-military organizations and the broader society in which they are embedded, making it much more difficult for a real schism to emerge. Instead of weakening their opponents, these tactics can unintentionally strengthen unity and resolve, bridging the gap between militant factions and the general population. The assassination of Hamas leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh, who left Gaza, eases internal dissension.

The real reason for Israel's current assassination policy is more a mechanism to galvanize its own society than a real change in the political or military position of its adversaries. The effectiveness of these tactics in destabilizing Israel's enemies has declined sharply, indicating a shift in the objective of these operations. Instead of paralyzing opposition forces, these targeted assassinations today serve primarily to ensure internal cohesion, rally Israeli national sentiment, and demonstrate Israel's intelligence and operational capabilities. They also allow Israel to assert that it has gained the upper hand in maneuvers aimed at dominating the escalation ladder with its adversaries.

Ultimately, these acts are displays of tactical prowess intended to enshrine the supremacy of Israeli power, largely intended to impress Israelis themselves at a time when Israelis feel their military and intelligence apparatus have failed in their task. When Israel speaks of “loss of deterrence,” it is not so much concerned with how its enemies perceive it as with how it perceives itself. The rhetoric of deterrence is less about external threats and more about maintaining an internal narrative of strength and invincibility, ensuring that the image of Israeli power remains intact in the collective psyche of its own society.

source: Mondoweiss

https://en.reseauinternational.net/la-veritable-raison-pour-laquelle-israel-assassine-des-dirigeants-du-hamas-et-du-hezbollah-et-pourquoi-cela-narretera-pas-la-resistance/

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.

Iranian media has rejected a report by The New York Times claiming that Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of the Palestinian Hamas Movement, was killed by an explosive device hidden in his room two months before the hit.

The newspaper, citing five Middle Eastern officials, reported on August 1 that the explosive device was hidden in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-run guesthouse in the Neshat compound in the northern outskirts of the Iranian capital, Tehran.

It detailed that the device was detained remotely around 2:00 am local time on July 31. The blast shook the building, shattered windows and partially collapsed an exterior wall.

The meticulous planning behind the attack was such that, despite the proximity of Ziyad al-Nakhalah, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who was staying next door, his room sustained minimal damage, as claimed by two Iranian officials, according to the newspaper.

It is not clear who are the Middle Eastern officials cited by The New York Times, and if they are from countries friendly with Iran.

The newspaper claims were denied by the Fars News Agency, which said that Haniyeh’s room in the Neshat compound was targeted with “an air-launched guided projectile.”

https://southfront.press/hamas-leader-was-killed-in-iran-by-strike-not-bomb/

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YOURDEMOCRACY.NET RECORDS HISTORY AS IT SHOULD BE — NOT AS THE WESTERN MEDIA WRONGLY REPORTS IT.