The Russian SMO (2): Why was it a global turning point?
TIM ANDERSON

 

While many in Washington welcomed a foreign state (Ukraine) fighting and dying in attempts to weaken Russia, seen as a global rival, in the Global South, disillusion with Western global governance drew attention to the counter-weight role of Russia and China and to the tyranny of the US dollar.

“There is little doubt the [Ukraine] war is a turning point in world history”

– Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard (2023)

 

In a first article:

I examined the question of whether the 2022 Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine was an imperial intervention, like the 2003 invasion of Iraq. My conclusion was in the negative, illustrated by several key differences: the SMO was arguably a measure of self-defence and was not an imperial intervention, like the US invasion of Iraq.  The SMO was not motivated by resource acquisition nor did it impose foreign rule.

Yet there was initially little direct international support for Russia. Despite that, within a short space of time, there was a wide clamour in the Global South for cooperation with Russia and, in particular, adherence to BRICS, the Russia and China-led bloc. Dozens of countries lined up to join BRICS (Univ Leiden 2024), making it the world’s largest economic bloc.

The SMO had an antithetical impact. While it was used as a rationale for wider economic warfare (unilateral ‘sanctions’ or coercive measures) against Russia by the US-EU bloc, it also galvanised support for the pre-existing Russian and Chinese plans for global restructuring. While the intervention may have caught many by surprise, it also sparked medium term opposition to NATO demands to economically isolate Russia. In parts of Asia, as also across Africa and Latin America, there was even admiration of Russia for finally standing up to the big bullies of the world.

While many in Washington welcomed a foreign state (Ukraine) fighting and dying in attempts to weaken Russia, seen as a global rival, in the Global South, disillusion with Western global governance drew attention to the counter-weight role of Russia and China and to the tyranny of the US dollar. The SMO seems to have catalysed an international polarisation against the hegemonic interests of the Anglo-Americans, aka ‘the west’; but how was this possible, if the US-led bloc had succeeded in diplomatically and economically isolating Russia? As it happened, much of Asia, Latin America and Africa took the opportunity to seek refuge from domination by western institutions. There was some increased regional cooperation with Russia alongside a virtual flood of applications to join the BRICS and, to some extent, also the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

In this article, I will address that contradiction through this question: How did the Russian SMO in Ukraine catalyse a turnaround in global alignments? The article begins with the initial reactions to the SMO, then the shifting dynamics in favour of Russia and, finally, the attraction and promise of BRICS and multipolarity.

1. Initial reactions

The February 2022 Russian intervention in Ukraine sparked deep controversy. In part one, I addressed the questions of whether this was a war of aggression, like the US-UK led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and whether there were legitimate Russian security concerns, in particular of an imminent threat to Russian people which would justify (under Article 51 of the UN Charter) such a drastic pre-emptive self-defence strike? That article concluded that the SMO had a plausible rationale of self-defence and that, in any case, it did not have the features of an imperial intervention. The Russian SMO in SE Ukraine did not seek to impose foreign rule, it was not motivated by a desire for resource control, and it did not deprive the local population of a full voice in their own governance.

Nevertheless, Russia breaching the UN-recognised borders of a sovereign state sparked a reaction and the NATO propaganda campaign was very effective. The Anglo-American line won the day in several early UN votes.

On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly, in an emergency session, passed a resolution “demanding the Russian Federation immediately end its invasion of Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces” from Ukraine. It passed easily, with 141 in favour, 5 against (Belarus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Russian Federation, Syria), but there were 35 abstentions (UN 2022) and 12 nations were absent.

The US Ambassador spoke of “the brazen and indiscriminate nature of the Russian Federation’s attacks, [which] has had devastating and horrific consequences for the entire country” (UN 2022). Her motion gained strong support.

Only a few loyal Russian allies opposed the motion, but the high number of abstentions signalled widespread uneasiness about the confrontation. Many countries that enjoyed very good relations with Russia (China, India, South Africa and Cuba) refused to either support or oppose the motion. This was likely due to long standing support for the principle of non-intervention and sovereign borders, in face of repeated US interventions.

The full list of 35 abstentions included: Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Another 12 countries were absent and made no vote: Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela.

The General Assembly vote followed the failure of a US-Albania UNSC resolution on 25 February (UNSC 2022a) to condemn the Russian intervention; Russia vetoed that resolution, while India and the UAE abstained. Two days later, the Security Council called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The vote here was 11 to one (Russia) with three abstentions (China, India and the UAE), but on such procedural motions there is no veto from the permanent members.

The US camp won the day at the General Assembly, but a range of perspectives were expressed. The Belarus representative noted that Ukraine had been “in a state of civil war for years and civilians have been dying in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces”. Commenting on paragraph 8 of the draft text which “hypocritically calls on all parties to fulfil the Minsk agreements”, the Belarus representative asked rhetorically, where had the sponsors of this resolution been “for the past eight years?”

The Chinese ambassador called on “all parties to do all they can to prevent the situation from deteriorating”, welcoming “the earliest possible direct dialogue between the Russian Federation and Ukraine” and supporting “talks with the Russian Federation and Europe to form a balanced security mechanism.” India said there was “no choice but to return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue” (UNSC 2022b).

Nevertheless, Washington and NATO moved rapidly into a proxy war against Russia, which included massive propaganda, economic coercive measures, and a more open arming and training of Ukraine forces. Some of these moves were documented in the first article.

Over the next two months there were three more UNGA resolutions against Russia and its SMO, showing much the same pattern, a large majority (140-143) condemning Russia, only five states opposing the motion and a substantial bloc (35-38) abstaining (Haddad 2023). Where the first motion demanded that Russia withdraw from SE Ukraine, the second blamed Russia for the “aggression” and humanitarian consequences of the war, while the fourth condemned the Russian “move to annex” parts of SE Ukraine. The main difference between the four votes was in the third, which sought to expel Russia from the Human Rights Council (HRC), where there were 93 states in favour, 24 against and 58 abstaining (Haddad 2023).

That third motion was based on the massacre of civilians in Bucha, which the US-led bloc blamed on Russia, but which was most likely a false flag operation. Many of the civilians killed, after a Russian withdrawal from an area near Kiev, were wearing white armbands, a sign of surrender to or sympathy with the Russians. Evidence strongly suggests they were killed by Ukrainian ultra-nationalists, notorious for their reprisals against “traitors”, for their “collaboration” with Russia (Reif 2022; Tuteja 2022). In any event, Russia withdrew from the HRC before it could be expelled.

The main factor which mitigated the anti-Russian feeling in these votes was the large abstention bloc, which contained states representing large populations in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The UN votes also reflected popular anti-Russian feeling which had been generated, especially in the Western or OECD countries. Pew polls showed strong anti-Russian sentiment (more than 80%) in the Western and OECD countries they surveyed (Fagan et al 2023). The main exceptions in the Pew polls were India (57% favourable to Russia), and Nigeria and Kenya (42% and 40% favourable). Gallup polls also show anti-Russian sentiment within the USA, at 2023, even higher than it had been against the Soviet Union in the late 1980s (maximum 66% unfavourable); and it had been that way (over 70%) since 2015 (Gallup 2024). That latter fact correlates to the propaganda wars following the 2014 Kiev coup.

There was certainly little international support for Russia right after the SMO, probably because of (1) deep adherence to the principle of inviolable UN-recognised sovereign borders; (2) cynicism about big power claims of self-defence; (3) a very powerful propaganda campaign by the Anglo-Americans, asserting repeatedly that the SMO was “unprovoked”; and (4) a reluctance to unnecessarily contradict the US-led bloc, for fear of retribution.

2. Shifting Dynamics

The anti-Russian sentiment does not help us explain the ‘turning point’ suggested as following the SMO, until we examine several offsetting factors: First, a long history of antipathy to the USA, its interventions and dollar dictatorship, second, a stark difference between views in the Western bloc and those of the Global South, and third, for whatever combination of reasons, a widespread drive to seek refuge from the unipolar world dominated by Washington and, in the alternative, to engage in deeper cooperation with Russia and the BRICS bloc.

The first offsetting factor involves parallel negative views of the USA. After all, on any view of it, the US-led invasion of Iraq was clearly a more open and cynical imperial intervention than the invasion of Ukraine could have been. Iraq was on the other side of the world and there were no North American populations being brutalised there. Yet very few states refused to cooperate with the USA, in principle, despite its long history of invasions and coups.

We should recall that, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a BBC poll in 11 mostly Western countries (Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Indonesia, “Israel”, Jordan, South Korea, Russia and the USA) showed that a majority (57%) had an unfavourable attitude towards US President Bush. The disapproval was highest in Russia (81%) and France (63%), countries which opposed that invasion. Those polled in five of the eleven countries also saw the US as more dangerous than Iran, which had been named by Bush as part of an “Axis of Evil” (Al Jazeera, 2003).

The Pew polls of 23 mostly western and OECD countries were more benign. Between 2000 and 2023, favourable views of the US dominated, albeit only fifty something percent in most cases (Wike et al 2023: 3).

A Latin American based global poll in 2021 showed a different picture, with very large groups in Asia (49%), Europe (39%) and Latin America (46%) agreeing that their “democracy was threatened” by the USA; all these regional figures were higher than the threat felt from Russia and, in the case of Europe and Latin America, higher than the threat felt from China (AOD 2021).

 

In this poll of 53 countries, the corrosive influence of the USA was seen as considerably higher than that of Russia or China. Notably, even the Europeans felt considerably more threatened by their US ‘ally’ (39%) than they did by Russia (29%) (AOD 2021).

The AOD polls were not comprehensive, but wider than the PEW polls. The 53 countries surveyed by AOD were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, “Israel”, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Vietnam (AOD 2021).

When we include more Global South countries, ignored by most pollsters, the picture is quite different. It is not that Western analysts are unaware of this divide. A February 2023 report on global public opinion prepared for the European Council on Foreign Relations noted that, while Russia’s SMO in Ukraine had “consolidated” opinion in the West, opinion in the Global South and in emerging powers like China, India and Turkiye was quite different (Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard 2023).

On the Ukraine war in particular, large majorities in India (66%), Turkiye (56%), Russia (73%) and China (54%) wanted the war in Ukraine to end as soon as possible, even if that meant Ukraine ceding territorial losses to Russia. This position was accepted by large minorities in the EU (35%), Great Britain (26%) and the USA (27%). Somewhat larger minorities in the protagonist countries, the EU (38%), Great Britain (44%) and the USA (34%) wanted Ukraine to regain all its territory, even if that means “a longer war or more Ukrainians being killed or displaced” (Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard 2023: 2).

More focused questions on how the SMO was seen revealed that only in Great Britain (30%) and the USA (52%) did the largest groups see US support for Ukraine as in defence of Ukraine “as a democracy” or in defence of its territorial integrity. By contrast, in Russia (60%), China (65%), Turkiye (65%), India (42%) and the EU (48%), the largest groups saw US backing of Ukraine as defending “Western dominance” and US security interests. Further, the Ukraine war impressed many in India (63%), Turkiye (44%) and China (40%) that Russia was stronger than they had “previously thought”; in each case this was on top of substantial groups which already thought that Russia “was and still is strong” (Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard 2023: 2-5).

Finally, majorities in the “emerging great powers” of India (80%) and Turkiye (69%) saw Russia as either “an ally – with shared interests and values” or a “necessary partner – with which we must “strategically cooperate”.  Similar views of the USA / EU were also high for India (87%/82%) and Turkiye (65%/73%). In other words, for these countries, the Russia-US rivalry was not widely regarded as a zero sum game (Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard 2023: 7-8).

That is an important element in the shift to the multipolar bloc represented by BRICS, which contains not only strategic opponents of the USA, like Russia, China and Iran, but also others like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India, which are broadly allied to the US but looking for new opportunities, particularly linked to China, now the global leader in many strategic industries (Bateman 2022).

India, for example, which has had border problems with China, and probably did not like Russia’s breach of Ukraine’s recognised borders, abstained, for the most part on the anti-Russia resolutions, on pragmatic grounds. This has been said to illustrate the tendency of a Global South country to give priority to its national interests while diversifying its partners; at the same time India “still views Russia as a vital partner for its military development” (Abrar, Basundoro and Trystanto 2022). In other words, Russia was not seen as a threat.

In the wake of the SMO, we saw either a continuity or enhancement of African, Asia and Latin American regional cooperation with Russia, and a flood of interest in joining BRICS. In January 2024, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran officially joined BRICS (Univ Leiden 2024), 34 more countries were lined up to join (McCarthy 2024) with more from Asia, Africa and even Europe considering joining (Tasnim 2024). The bloc “has already surpassed the Group of Seven in terms of purchasing power parity: accounting for 35.6% of the global GDP, while the G7 accounts for 30.3%.” (MD 2024). Even before new memberships the group “combines 45% of the world’s population and almost half of the global production of crude oil” (Univ Leiden 2024). BRICS gross domestic product in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms has surpassed that of the G7; by 2023 it had a global share of 32.1% compared to the G7’s 29.9% (Statista 2024).

While US and European cooperation with Russia was frozen, particularly at the expense of cheap energy supply to Europe, bilateral US-Russian trade and investment were never at very high levels, especially when compared to Russia’s other partners, such as the EU and China (CRS 2023: 2). This limited the direct impact of US unilateral ‘sanctions’ on Russia. However, US coercive measures had a greater impact through the US dominated SWIFT system of banking information exchange. That blockade pushed Russia into financial innovation, bilaterally and through BRICS, where bilateral currency swaps had become popular.

The result was that, unlike in small countries like Cuba and Syria, where the impact of a US financial blockade was severe, Russia weathered the sanctions storm after the SMO, largely through developing much higher levels of trade with China and India (Teslova 2023; Hayley 2024).

In addition to the rush for BRICS membership, Russia developed some stronger relations with Global South regions. Despite a temporary drop in 2022 trade with the ASEAN bloc of South East Asian Nations, the ASEAN-Russia Workplan on Energy Cooperation continued, as did Russian FDI plans, Tourism Cooperation and the Plan of Action for ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership (ASEAN 2023; Atmanta 2023). Billy Mambrasar, an aide to Indonesian President Joko Widodo, participating in a 2024 youth conference in Russia, stressed the importance of dispelling negative “stereotypes about Russia” and recognising Russia “as an example of multipolarity and leadership for developing nations” (Pillai 2024).

While the Arab world was divided over the SMO – with Syria supporting Russia, some of the Persian Gulf monarchies backing the US position (Saudis, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain) and others abstaining (Algeria, Iraq) – important economic relations persisted. Much of the Arab world relies on grain imports from Russia and benefited from high oil prices following the SMO (Sadygzade 2024). Notably, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were in the second wave of BRICS members, formally joining in January 2024.

A 2023 survey of Arab Youth found that most wanted US influence to diminish in the region, and 86% saw US-backed “Israel” as their enemy; on the Ukraine war the biggest group (28 per cent) said the conflict would most likely be resolved by diplomatic means (Ryan 2023).

Russia-Africa relations actually improved after the SMO, particularly amongst those Sahel nations Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – plus potentially Chad and Sudan – which sought to escape neo-colonial relations with France and the USA, both of which had used the ‘fighting terrorism’ pretext to occupy the Sahel region. Russia’s enhanced security presence in that region was said to reflect a “restructuring of global power architecture” (Klomegah 2024).

After a polemic about shipping and who was blocking grain exports from Ukraine (Polityuk 2023) – most of this grain turned out to be going to Europe for animal feed (Dupraz-Dobias 2023) – Russia increased its grain commerce with and grain donations to several African countries.

In July 2023, during the Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg, President Putin “pledged to provide free food assistance, to six African countries. Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR), and Eritrea were slated to receive up to 50,000 tons of grain each from Russia”. Along with these free deliveries, Russia exported 11.5 million tons of grain to Africa in 2022, reaching the 10 million-ton mark in the first six months of 2023 (RT 2024a).

US sources decry increasing Russian influence in Africa, using it as a rationale for increased US military presence in Africa. According to Washington embedded sources, Russia and the Russian linked Wagner Group militia “have undermined democratic stability and driven conflict on the continent” (Ferragamo 2023: 2). The government of Niger seems to have rejected this claim while expelling the US military from Niger (Al Jazeera 2024). Mali had earlier expelled the French military, accusing them of arming the ‘jihadists’ and thus worsening Sahel terrorism (O’Brien 2022). The US had previously used the false pretext of ‘fighting terrorism’ to sustain its occupation of Syria and Iraq (Anderson 2019: Chapter 5). The formation of the Sahel Alliance and its closer relations with Russia (Klomegah 2024) was a direct reaction to this type of deception and attempted hegemony. The Central African Republic (CAR), after decades of violence and instability, despite earlier military cooperation with the US (AFRICOM 2024), has also invited Russia to establish a military base in the country (RT 2024b).

In Latin America, where several states had at times abstained in the 2022 UN votes against Russia (Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Savador), probably through commitment to their long standing defence of sovereign borders, Russia expanded its relations. Russia promised further debt cancellation to Cuba while it committed to deeper cooperation in industrial biotechnology (Prensa Latina 2024).

Once again, US analysts accused Russian engagement with Latin America of having sinister aims and of bolstering regimes with “autocratic values” (Berg 2024), disingenuously ignoring the US support for a long line of military dictatorships in Latin America (Boot 2018). Currently, and in violation of international law, Washington imposes unilateral coercive measures (“sanctions”) against Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua – measures which adversely affect anyone who trades with these independent nations. Bolivia’s former Foreign Minister, Fernando Huanacuni, said US punitive measures have had “catastrophic consequences” in the region (Xinhua 2024).

US policy and practice towards the region affect European relations too, even though EU policy towards Latin America is not always the same as that of Washington. EU leaders are said to want to “reboot relations” with Latin America, competing for influence with Russia and China, while complaining that the fallout from Ukraine war was “hampering their efforts” (Valero, Tadeo and Adghirni 2023). It is likely that a number of Latin states (especially those of the ALBA bloc) see the Europeans as partners with the US in attacking Russia, and therefore unreliable independent partners in a region with a long history of US intervention.

In sum, while 2023 saw a surge of interest in the opportunities offered by BRICS, many in the African, Asian and Latin American regions maintained and even increased their cooperation with Russia, for strategic reasons.

There was very limited support for the Russian SMO in 2022, for reasons discussed above (commitment to sovereign borders, cynicism about big power self-defence claims, the Anglo-American propaganda campaign and a reluctance to confront Washington). Nevertheless, several dynamic factors seem to have led to a strategic shift towards Russia and BRICS within a short span of time. First, many countries were looking for an alternative to the US-dominated world; second, some countries sought refuge from the siege of the dollar dictatorship, and third, others yet saw the BRICS as a ‘non-zero-sum’ developmental option which might not necessarily invoke confrontation with the Anglo-Americans. After all, several US allies have joined BRICS. Further, the fact that Russia directly confronted US-NATO expansionism in Eastern Europe may have scared some, but was probably admired by others.

3. The Promise of BRICS

What was the appeal of BRICS? And has Russia really become “the military spearhead of the Global South” in the fight against the fading US-led hegemonic order (Sadygzade 2024)?

Let’s first look at the appeal of the Russia- and China-led group. We should first recognise that BRICS is not primarily an ideological bloc, even though the group includes several independent states that want to escape the economic siege imposed on them by US unilateral coercive measures (unilateral “sanctions”). The bloc offers new options of cooperation, without coercive measures; escape from the unipolar dollar dictatorship; and shelter for those states already subject to economic siege, through unilateral ‘sanctions’.

BRICS provides the first genuine multilateral trade and investment forum since the collapse of the G7 dominated WTO, in the early years of the 21st Century (Khor 2004; Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004). Many countries want to take advantage of the developmental possibilities of a new grouping which is more committed to the sovereign equality of states and practising less coercive measures. That is in stark contrast to the days of the ‘Washington Consensus’, where many were affected by political lending conditions imposed by the development banks and G7 aid programs. There was deep resentment at pressures to remove social or environmental controls on foreign investors, to privatise state assets and to drop all subsidies on basic goods (Grugel, Riggirozzi and Thirkell-White 2008).

The BRICS group, on the other hand, has experience in developing world concerns such as infrastructure, public health and poverty reduction ((McBride, Hawkes, and Buse 2019; Ghosh and Sarkar 2023), in ways that differ from the G7 method of using ‘aid’ to lever commercial opportunities for their own corporations.

New BRICS members Iran and Egypt began improving bilateral relations even before their formal accession in 2024, planning banking, medical, tourism and transport cooperation. Iran has also expressed willingness to cooperate with Egypt in establishing joint banks, and shipping companies (Tehran Times 2023). This, following China-brokered improved relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Fantappie and Nasr 2023), strongly suggests that BRICS can catalyse new possibilities in mutual benefit, despite political difference.

It might be expected that BRICS members will enjoy favourable terms of trade within the bloc, because of the greater likelihood of bilateral swaps or use of a basket of currencies. Trading in domestic currencies can lead to local currency appreciation, stabilisation, and increased purchasing power. This is no zero sum game, as BRICS cooperation does not negate the possibility of commercial relations outside the bloc. Intra-BRICS trade may well resurrect a new system of multilateral preferences, for BRICS members.

In financial terms, former Bolivian President Evo Morales says that BRICS is “the best hope” for liberation from the dollar dictatorship (Barrios and Jaramillo 2024). This dollar dictatorship has meant tight US control of the global financial system through enforcement of the US dollar as the key means of exchange and reserve holding, including dollar domination of oil sales, and US domination of the SWIFT system of inter-bank communications. This control allows the US to “weaponise” the dollar, (Tayeb 2023) enforcing unilateral coercive measures (UCMs, often wrongly called ‘sanctions’), including by completely excluding some countries (e.g. Iran, Cuba, Russia, Venezuela) from global banking. There have been efforts for many years now to displace this financial dictatorship (Crosston and Deahn 2015). Since most US UCMs also apply to third parties, the entire world is subject to this dictatorial regime.

Even before dollar imposed demands, the dollar monopoly imposes developmental disadvantages. When the US dollar appreciates, other currencies depreciate, and while that can help some with the prices of export commodities, a strong dollar also suppresses global trade growth “as it is the invoicing currency of the world”. Those with weaker currencies lose their capacity to engage in trade. The strong dollar also “makes countries that have dollar denominated debt less creditworthy” as it becomes harder to purchase the US currency to manage debts (Baldwin 2023: 2-3). Dollar appreciation shocks create “downturns in emerging and developing economies”. It is well recognised that a strong dollar, with consequent higher interest rates and slower economic growth is “challenging” for developing economies (Obstfeld and Zhou 2023).

IMF analysts have confirmed that “negative spillovers from US dollar appreciations fall disproportionately on emerging market economies”, compared to even the smaller advanced economies (Bems and Moussa 2023: 1). US dollar appreciation has an income effect, meaning that “as the dollar appreciates, commodity prices fall; weaker commodity prices depress domestic demand via lower real income; real GDP in emerging markets decelerates; and vice versa”. US interest rates have a similar negative impact (Druck, Magud and Mariscal 2015). So escape from dollar domination has potential developmental benefits for most of the Global South.

Finally, those 20 to 30 countries under effective siege by US and European UCMs will seek refuge in BRICS, the more so when BRICS engages in financial innovation, independent of the dollar and the SWIFT system. These ‘sanctions’ regimes, policed by the dollar and SWIFT tyranny (Coates 2019; GAO 2020), have quadrupled in number since 1980, with 92 listed in 1980 and 407 in 2016 (Felbermayr et al 2020: 54). Of 1,102 sanctions listed since 1950, only 77 (or 7%) were imposed by the United Nations; the other 93% were mostly by the USA, the EU and allies (Felbermayr et al 2020: appendix). Most unilateral ‘sanctions’ have no basis in international law, as they typically attempt to coerce political objectives, prohibited by the common law principle of non-intervention and by an implied ban in the UN Charter. So these UCMs represent an illegitimate regime.

Even third parties will benefit from refuge in BRICS, as they also have been subject to US Treasury dictates. For example, between 2018 and 2023, South Korea was forced, against its will, to freeze $7bn in Iranian funds held for the Korean purchase of Iranian oil, because of US unilateral measures imposed on Iran (Paik 2019; KJD 2023). South Korea had previously been “one of Iran’s leading Asian oil customers,” as the Asian country preferred to import Iranian condensate, an ultra-light form of crude oil, (Reuters 2022).

BRICS is expanding rapidly and its sheer weight (Lu 2023) will remain a magnet for many Global South countries. Its growing share of global population, mineral and energy resources and overall production and income is even greater when converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Statista (2024) has BRICS PPP income surpassing that of the G7 in the year 2020. The relevance of BRICS after the Ukraine war is more obvious when we note that well informed European opinion does not see even the unlikely event of a US victory in Ukraine as restoring a “US-led global liberal order” (Garton Ash, Krastev and Leonard 2023: 9). Forward looking leaders will have to chart their future options.

In summary, while the Russian SMO in Ukraine received little initial diplomatic support, it did little to help consolidate global support for US hegemony, except amongst European and some OECD countries. Large sections of the Global South decided to abstain from this particular controversy and maintain or extend their strategic relations with Russia and the emerging Russia-China led BRICS bloc.

Apparently the Russian intervention was not seen as a strategic threat, unlike the US invasion of Iraq and long standing US financial dictates. Further, Russia was seen cooperating with victims of US-backed terrorism, such as Syria, and not staying beyond its welcome as an occupier, as the US has done in Iraq (Mousa 2023). The apparent diplomatic victory of the Anglo-Americans after the Russian SMO was undermined by several shifting dynamics – in particular a search for alternative, non-coercive forms of cooperation – with much of Asia, Africa and Latin America looking to diversify relations through agreements with Russia and BRICS. The Russia and China led bloc has promised a strategic alternative, with new opportunities in the first genuinely multilateral bloc since the demise of the WTO, plus a potential refuge from the dollar dictatorship and from punishment by US and EU unilateral sanctions (UCMs).

https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/the-russian-smo–2—why-was-it-a-global-turning-point

 

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