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Gareth Evans’ review of Australia’s strategic relationship with the United States (“Why Australia can’t rely on the US to save it from China,” 12 December) provides a timely wake-up call on the dangers of Australia sleepwalking into what would be a catastrophic conflict with China.

 

Australia sleepwalking into catastrophic conflict with China    By Jon Stanford

 

As Evans says, “a cutting-edge issue … is whether the US will really feel obliged to rush to our military defence if we are ever seriously threatened, or only do so if its own national interests are also directly at stake … it defies credibility to think that Washington would risk losing Los Angeles to save Sydney.”

Australia’s assessment of its own national interest in foreign policy never seems to go beyond an irrational, neo-colonial assumption that it is identical to that of the United States. As Evans relates, “Peter Dutton … said in 2021 that it was ‘inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the US’ in any military action it chose to take. Defence minister Marles made clear his own view in October that Australia ‘cannot be a passive bystander in the event of war’.” Think back to 1939 when Menzies said “Great Britain has declared war upon [Germany], and … as a result, Australia is also at war.” What has really changed?

One change that has become apparent in the last decade, since the existence of the Five Eyes group was revealed, is the extent to which the intelligence agencies now influence Australia’s foreign and defence policy. Moreover, despite the group’s multi-ocular title, Five Eyes appears to analyse world affairs through a prism that provides a narrow, one-eyed view. Not only is this clearly an American view, but particularly in relation to the strategic competition between the US and China, it reflects the perspective emanating from Fairfax, Virginia and the Pentagon rather than from Foggy Bottom.

Australia never seems to have made a careful assessment of the relative benefits each country derives from the American relationship and how, in our national interest, we might derive a greater advantage from it. Australia is important to America mainly because of our geography. The existence of a physically large, Anglophone, democratic country with no land borders strategically located in the Indo Pacific and the southern hemisphere is potentially of enormous value to the US, which has boundless interests in this region.

Our geography has been of critical significance since the very beginning of the relationship when General Douglas MacArthur landed in Australia in March 1942. While MacArthur publicly promoted the bond of ‘consanguinity’ between the US and White Australia, he privately made clear to Prime Minister Curtin at the outset that the US had no particular national interest in defending Australia. He was here because of an accident of geography; the US needed a large and secure base in this theatre from which they could eventually go forth and defeat Japan.

Curtin, whose reputation as a great Australian leader should be more contestable, failed to understand that America’s need for an Australian base gave his government considerable agency in the relationship. Instead, he established an unfortunate precedent by surrendering substantial Australian sovereignty to the egotistical American general, who became commander of all Australian land and air forces in the region. He later confessed he was taken by surprise by the bounty provided by the Australian prime minister, a gift he proceeded to employ to advance American national interests. As a result, according to military historian Max Hastings, “Australia seemed almost to vanish from the [Pacific] war after 1943 … the country’s internal dissensions, together with American dominance of the Pacific theatre, caused the Australian army to be relegated to a frankly humiliating role in 1944-45.”

With the defeat of Japan and the onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Australian relationship did not figure significantly in America’s strategic priorities. In 1951, the US concluded both the ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand and the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan. Neither treaty included a security guarantee along the lines of Article V of NATO. In 1960, however, in return for allowing the US to establish military bases on its territory, Japan successfully insisted on the inclusion of a security guarantee in its treaty, including extended nuclear deterrence.

At much the same time, the rapidly developing space race between the US and the Soviet Union provided a new focus for American interest in the strategic advantages provided by Australia’s geography. In 1962, a White House position paper proposed that “with ample space, relatively advanced technology, political stability and conservative government, Australia has become a uniquely desirable base for both military and civilian programs involving operations in the Southern Hemisphere.”

Bill Battle, US Ambassador in Canberra in the early 1960s, negotiated very favourable terms with the Menzies government for the establishment of major strategic installations in Australia, including Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape. These facilities were regarded by the US as essential to its national security. Pine Gap, in particular, was an advanced espionage facility that, together with its sister station in the UK, provided global coverage of electronic communications as well as critical data on the performance of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles. As the Fraser government later confirmed, these highly advanced installations also made Australia a nuclear target.

Gough Whitlam took office in 1972 committed to forging a more independent foreign policy. In April 1974, having ratified Australia’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the previous year, he stated in Parliament that no new foreign bases would be permitted and leases on existing facilities would not be renewed. With the lease on Pine Gap due to expire in December 1975, this set the cat among the pigeons in Washington.

This is the only significant occasion in which Australia essentially stood up to the Americans in its own national interest. It didn’t end well. In July 1974, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to President Nixon, advised the president to commission a National Strategic Security Memorandum (NSSM 204) reviewing the whole relationship with Australia.

An analysis of the still highly redacted NSSM 204, released in 2014, reveals that in the mid-1970s Australia’s strategic importance to the US was considerably greater than was appreciated at the time. A number of strategic, economic and cultural elements in the relationship were identified and rated in terms of their importance to both the US and Australia. Only three of the various elements received the top grade in terms of importance, being rated as ‘exceedingly high’. These three, which were all benefits to the US, were the CIA espionage facility at Pine Gap, the naval communications station at North West Cape and, more generally, American investment in Australia.

Tellingly, although the overall relationship with the US was rated as being of very high importance to Australia in light of our “fears of being isolated in Asia”, not one individual element was rated as being of ‘exceedingly high’ importance to Australia.

The policy approach adopted by Kissinger as a result of NSSM204 is heavily redacted, but it is possible to identify the two main alternative options that were considered. A principled approach that recognised Australia’s right to pursue its sovereign national interests while retaining ANZUS, was put forward by Ambassador Marshall Green and supported by the State Department. Green proposed a negotiation with Whitlam to extend the lease on Pine Gap to 1978, which would allow time for the facility to be moved to Guam.

This was not adopted by Kissinger, who, no doubt, would have dismissed it as ‘limp wristed’. Instead, it appears the CIA’s preferred option was adopted, namely to seek to retain the facilities in Australia for as long as possible. It is highly suggestive that Whitlam was dismissed from office in November 1975, just before the lease on Pine Gap was due to expire. The lease was immediately renewed by Whitlam’s successor, Malcolm Fraser.

With the rise of China to great power status, the benefits the US derives from Australia’s geography are only likely to have increased over the past half century. Successive Australian governments have never understood that America has always needed Australia at least as much as we have needed the US. Consequently, Australia’s foreign policy has been fundamentally misguided for the last sixty years. In a consistent but unnecessary effort to reinforce American support for what is an inadequate alliance, we have followed the US into wars – such as in Vietnam, Iraq and arguably Afghanistan – that were not in Australia’s national interest.

Instead, when the US installed major defence facilities on Australian soil in the 1960s, we should have followed Japan and insisted on the inclusion of a security guarantee in the ANZUS treaty. Australia is of greater strategic importance to America than almost every NATO country and yet, under the terms of its alliance with the US, North Macedonia is guaranteed a far higher level of security, including extended nuclear deterrence, than is provided to Australia under ANZUS.

And now we have AUKUS. The author is part of a group that, in seeking a more self-reliant sovereign capability to defend Australia, advocated the procurement of nuclear-powered attack submarines for the RAN. It is difficult to disagree with Gareth Evans, however, that by acquiring American submarines that would otherwise be part of the US fleet, we may be unable to resist participating in a war with China that would be highly damaging to our national interest. As Curran has reported, “President Biden’s Asia ‘tsar’, Kurt Campbell described the AUKUS agreement as ‘getting Australia off the fence. We have them locked in now for the next 40 years’.”

As Evans suggests, Australia’s lack of a security guarantee and extended nuclear deterrence leaves us in a vulnerable position. We put ourselves at the front of the pack in challenging China over COVID-19 and other issues and suffered damaging economic coercion as a result. The Americans told us they ‘had our backs’, but any material support was lacking. Instead, US industries moved into our former markets.

Now consider a showdown over Taiwan. China presents Taipei with an ultimatum. The Americans, being outgunned by the PLA’s conventional forces in the theatre, resort to nuclear blackmail, as they have in the past. How would China wargame a response? One option would be to attack Pine Gap with a long-range missile armed with a small, low yield nuclear warhead. Pine Gap would be a legitimate military target and the civilian population around Alice Springs is not extensive. It would not even be the first nuclear explosion in central Australia.

In response to such an attack, under ANZUS the US would be required only to consult with the Australian government. China would have demonstrated its nuclear capability. No rational US president would risk sacrificing Los Angeles in defence of Taiwanese autonomy. The nuclear codes would go back into the briefcase. A peaceful solution would be found.

And Australia would have taken one for the team.

https://johnmenadue.com/australia-sleepwalking-into-catastrophic-conflict-with-china/

 

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obama wages war on Yemen...

 

 

 

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red-sea....

 

The Red Sea: Think it through before jumping!    By Mack Williams

 

Last week the self-appointed “strategic” experts’ in the Opposition predictably were quick off the mark to criticise Prime Minister Albanese for taking time to carefully consider a US Navy approach (in public) for an RAN ship to be deployed to yet another US “coalition of the willing” in the Middle East. This time to mount an international response to attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea by the rebel Houthi regime controlling much of Yemen.

From its outset the Albanese Government correctly has recognised that our recent past is all too littered by Australian governments falling over themselves to rush into and respond to US requests for military support especially, but not only, in in the Middle East. Memories of the WMD farce which led us into Iraq remain. As also is the increasing scepticism in the US about its headlong rush into the “war of terror” following the Twin Towers tragedy which cost the US (and Australia) so dearly in personnel killed and injured let alone in years and dollars. It also provided the first test for Albanese’s commitment to prioritising the urgent strategic need to boost our presence and capability in the Indo Pacific. There had been a hasty announcement in early October by Defence Minister Marles of the despatch of a “significant” increase in forces along with two RAAF aircraft to an undisclosed location in the region as a contingency in case of need for evacuation of Australians from the area.

So it was reassuring that the Government has taken its time to give very careful consideration of the US request for the deployment of an RAN vessel to help in the Red Sea. Its focus should immediately have switched to the lessons from our recent military expeditions with the Americans in that part of the world. High on that list should be the fullest possible understanding of what the Americans have in mind as its principal objectives, the risks of it spilling into a wider confrontation, and some idea of an exit strategy. For one quick example, how likely would it be that the RAN vessel might have to go beyond purely anti-missile or drone defence into countermeasures which would involve firing at Houthi small boats or even missile sites inside the Yemen – all with incipient civilian casualties? Who would issue the commands for such action? Who would accept responsibility for damage to international shipping and contents in any military attempt to free them from Houthi control? And there are many more.

For starters, the USN approach was confused by the USN admiral pairing the Red Sea shipping defence with wider US concerns about attacks by Iranian proxies on US forces spread throughout the area. With all of this on the run as Defense Secretary Austin was hotfooting it to Israel to try to pressure the Israelis to temper their brutal Gaza invasion. He announced a new US led task force with the beguiling title Operation Prosperity Guardian involving the US, the UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles and Spain. It will be run under the umbrella of a pre-existing multilateral grouping in the region, the Combined Maritime Forces, and the leadership of its Task Force 153, which focuses on the Red Sea. It is co-located with USN Central Command and 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain.

As the Australian media have reported, apart from the pushback on broader strategic concerns in government about diluting capability in the Asia Pacific, Canberra also had issues about availability and capability of RAN ships. The media, again presumably based on leaks, claimed that the government had been able to intervene with Washington to have the request for a ship be replaced with one for personnel to be based in the new taskforce HQ in Bahrain. While removing the ADF from the actual naval patrols this is likely to get it more involved in any of the wider American campaign against Iran which is largely based out of Bahrain.

And of course the request came hot on the heels of a US Congressional vote approving the pathway for AUKUS. A bit too soon to be calling in the chits! Though it was disappointing to see armchair critics in Australia claiming that the government’s timely consideration of the request was inconsistent with the global spirit of AUKUS.

The speed with which the US has acted to create the new task force probably has been dictated in part by the White House’s overriding concern about the striking loss of international support for Israel’s savage war on Gaza and critical US military supplies for it. In all of this attention should also have been alerted by the distinct lack of enthusiasm among Arab and Muslim stakeholders (especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt) in the region for joining this new US led task force. Some commentators with maritime backgrounds have also speculated about the physical challenges the new task force will likely confront. It is of an order of complexity well above that of the earlier campaign against Somali based pirates given the weaponry the Houthi have at their disposal.

The speed with which the major international shipping companies have acted to divert ships away from the Suez and Red Sea underlines the urgency of resolving the crisis. The outcome of the rushed special Ministerial meeting being held by the US has yet to emerge. More naval hardware crammed into the Red Sea however is unlikely to provide a sustainable longer term answer and, in fact, could seriously risk spillage into wider regional military confrontation.

The appalling series of events in Israel and Gaza clearly have changed the landscape in the Middle East and significantly diminished US influence in the region – and, arguably, more globally. This calls for a fundamental review of strategies within and towards the region. I am no expert in the area but it is abundantly clear that the old brew is not working – if it ever has for so many years. One major take away – especially for Australia given our strategic considerations – is just how successful China has been in its quiet, assiduous penetration into the region where hitherto it had left the running to the US and Russia. Xi is well and truly part of the equation in the Middle East now – much to the chagrin of Washington. Very skilfully, China has managed to encourage the Saudis and Iranians to patch up their long testy relationship – no mean feat given the depth of their enmity – and one unlikely to be welcomed in Washington. The Chinese have developed a close relationship with the Arab and Muslim caucus and as rotating chair of the UN Security Council put its head above the international parapet by announcing its own plan for solving the Israel:Gaza dilemma.

Of particular relevance to the present crisis, is the critical importance of the Suez/Red Sea shipping lanes to Chinese national interests. It is estimated that 60% of Chinese trade with Europe passes through the Suez. For this reason it has established a naval base in Djibouti (along with the US, France and a number of others) and its ships participated in the original multinational anti-piracy task force in the Arabian Sea.

In recent years, China’s presence in Egypt’s strategic ports has grown noticeably. This includes the involvement of both private and state-owned Chinese companies in the partial acquisition, development, and operation of Egyptian seaports and terminals. In addition to a Chinese state-owned company holding stakes in two ports at the northern and southern entrances of the Suez Canal. This coincides with significant Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, a 455-sq-km special economic zone located along a maritime corridor of vital importance to global trade.

Both Washington and Beijing share enormous national interests in the safety of international shipping in the Suez/Red Sea – both directly and through the knock on effect to world trade and the world economy. The immediate US response is so Pavlovian and so “go for your guns”! Worse than that it lacks any exploration of possible different ways to achieve even better outcomes. And clearly risks likely widening the war in some challenging ways which have not yet revealed themselves.

Perish the thought! Would it not be worth trying some real statecraft with the Chinese who also have substantial shared interests in this shipping route? Both Biden and Xi have given some recent indications that they are keen to cooperate on international issues where they can – and this has been demonstrated by their discussions leading up to COP28. If the level of influence Iran has on the Houthis is as claimed by the US, it would seem very worthwhile to encourage China to use whatever leverage it has on Iran to persuade the Houthis to back off from their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. This could pave the way to a peaceful resolution to this issue and potentially more quickly. For much the same reason this could also be a topic for Canberra’s discussions with Beijing.

https://johnmenadue.com/the-red-sea-think-it-through-before-jumping/

 

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india-africa forum.....

 

By Samir Bhattacharya

 

How the Global South is rediscovering centuries of shared history to challenge Western domination


India’s engagement with Africa, backed by the common legacy of a colonial past, aims to create a true multipolar world

 

India’s history with Africa goes back several centuries when Indian traders traveled to the eastern coasts of the continent using the monsoon winds. Immediately after gaining independence from the British in 1947, India, as one of the first decolonized countries, decided to spearhead the struggle for a more just global order.

While ‘the Global South’ is in the headlines of the media around the world today, few would recall that in April 1955, representatives from 29 governments of Asian and African nations that emerged from the yoke of their European colonialists gathered in Bandung, Indonesia to lay the groundwork for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

In 1961, the first NAM summit in Belgrade drew delegates from 25 African, Asian, Latin American, and European countries under the leadership of Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia, to discuss the role of the Third World in the Cold War.

Over the decades, India has succeeded in holding on to its strong friendship with most African nations. Today, Africa draws more attention from New Delhi partly because of its camaraderie forged through shared experiences of economic development post decolonization.

However, as the rise of Africa would increase global multipolarity, it is also a strategic consideration for India. As the country seeks a leadership role in the Global South, it is important to have the African bloc as its ally.

India in Africa: Development projects and more

Under the framework of the Group of Twenty (G20) presidency, India hosted the final summit on September 9 and 10 in the presence of more than 40 world leaders, including the G20 heads of state or their representatives. One major outcome of the event, arguably the most significant, was that India successfully secured a permanent place in the G20 for the African Union (AU), the continental body of 55 member states.  

The AU’s entry into the G20 will indeed provide India with another platform to engage with Africa on a continental level, but this cannot replace the framework of the India-Africa Forum Summit, which has been India’s key outreach program for Africa since 2008.

Indeed, New Delhi’s active engagement with the region was initiated in the early 2000s. The first India-Africa Forum Summit took place in 2008 in New Delhi and was attended by the governments of 14 African nations selected by the AU and India. India also hosted the second summit in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.

The third summit was held in 2015 in New Delhi. This was the most extensive diplomatic outreach undertaken by the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which involved representatives from 54 African countries, 41 of which were presidents, including Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Abdel Fatah el-Sisi of Egypt, Jacob Zuma of South Africa, and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria.

Since then, there has been a significant increase in senior Indian leadership visits to Africa, along with a greater emphasis on training and development assistance. The establishment of new embassies in 18 African countries in the past five years demonstrates the increased attention paid to Africa by New Delhi.

Similar to other powerful nations, India has included development partnerships encompassing both grants and concessional loans as a crucial instrument in its diplomatic arsenal – and it has accomplished this in the distinctive ‘India Way’.

In total, India’s development outreach globally since 2008 has expanded to 64 countries with 300 Lines of Credit (LOCs) for 540 projects. Out of these, 321 projects encompassing 205 LOCs are currently being implemented in Africa. 

In recent years, these initiatives have been qualitatively expanded, particularly concerning the scale and complexity of the projects inside the LOCs.

Prominent initiatives funded by India include the construction of government buildings in Burundi and Ethiopia, sugar plants in Ethiopia and Ghana, cement production in Djibouti and the Republic of Congo, power plants in Sudan, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, water in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Guinea, and health in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Zambia. This steady growth in Indian interests in Africa is reflected in an expanded footprint and deeper engagement – 51 out of 54 nations of the continent host such development projects.

A more coordinated strategy and tighter supervision by the Exim Bank of India have also improved the efficiency of their planning and execution. Grant support provided by the government of India is distributed globally, encompassing nearly all developing regions, even more broadly than the LOCs.

An enhanced track record of project delivery has coincided with increased development aid offers. However, as the government does not make these impact analysis reports public, it is difficult to evaluate its overall utility.

In addition to its economic diplomacy, with the help of the International Day of Yoga, the International Solar Alliance, and most recently, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, India’s branding has grown significantly.

At the same time, training collaboration under ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) involves over 10,000 Africans annually in subjects ranging from IT and public administration to election management, SME, entrepreneurship, rural development, parliamentary affairs, and renewable energy.

Two digital initiatives are also in pilot mode in Africa today – e-Vidya Bharati distance learning and e-Aarogya Bharati distance health. Going beyond mere cooperation, these initiatives reflect India’s growing leadership role in the Global South. To some Indian Ocean island states, India has supplied naval equipment, provided training, and undertaken hydrographic services.

The heart of the Global South revitalized

At the G20 summit this year, India unveiled several novel initiatives, including the Global South Center of Excellence, the Global South Science and Technology Initiative, the Global South Young Diplomats Forum, the Global South Scholarships, and Aarogya Maitri (Wellness Friendship). Even as the specifics of these measures are still being worked out, Africa – the ‘heart of the Global South’ – would undoubtedly benefit from these programs, adding an extra layer of support beyond that given to African countries under the framework of the India-Africa Forum Summit.

Since the latest summit in 2015, a lot has changed geopolitically, economically, and in terms of global priorities. In order to build on the successes of earlier summits and to cater to the needs of the evolving global landscape, it is imperative that India host the fourth summit. 

In defining its policies at the continental, regional, and bilateral levels, India must contend with numerous differences while maintaining connections with all 54 African nations. It would be challenging to determine the course of policy toward the post-colonial states of Africa if one did not consider their diversity with regard to their colonial past, strategic importance, resource endowments, and degrees of socio-economic and technological development.

India and Africa’s relationship has developed naturally through cooperative methods. Currently, the main avenues for Indo-African cooperation are capacity-building programs, credit lines, grant support, development projects, technical consulting, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and military cooperation.

However, the tale of India in Africa has not received the recognition it merits, partly because India doesn’t play to the gallery. Relationships with eastern African nations bordering the Indian Ocean, with which India has closer ties and a more extended history, are especially significant to the Indo-Pacific discussion.

India now has a noticeable presence in Africa and many other regions where ties were previously weaker. In fact, this kind of greater cross-continental communication together with substantial interaction, primes India for a global mindset.

As the world moves toward increasing multipolarity, India is prepared for the next stage of its own evolution. Given that India is once again at the center of world geopolitics, chairing summits, navigating difficult choices, and negotiating a seat at the high table of global governance, the time is opportune to convene the much-anticipated India-Africa Forum Summit.

https://www.rt.com/india/589499-global-south-india-africa/

 

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