‘Special intelligence operations’ grant ASIO officers immunity from prosecution if they break the law; they are also protected by an impenetrable wall of secrecy.

The attorney general, George Brandis, may have approved at least one highly secretive “special intelligence operation” under which Australian Security Intelligence Organisation officers are granted sweeping immunity from prosecution in the use of force – but he won’t tell you. Asio won’t tell you. Even our intelligence watchdog won’t tell you. And journalists quite simply can’t tell you.

This is not a review of an episode of the TV show Utopia (although it’s probably on their agenda for next season). This is the strange situation in which journalists now find themselves when reporting – just generally – on whether even one of these operations exists.

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Special intelligence operations were authorised under Tony Abbott’s government in September 2014 as part of the first tranche of national security legislation flagged by Brandis. Asio officers and affiliates involved in such operations have sweeping immunity from prosecution in situations where they may need to commit offences as part of intelligence operations. This immunity can extend to the use of force and other offences, but does not apply to causing death or serious injury, torture or the commission of sexual crimes.

The new operations have attracted heavy criticism from news organisations, legal groups and civil rights organisations because they potentially criminalise public interest reporting and other disclosures about Asio operations.

Under section 35P of the Asio Act, any disclosure that relates to a special intelligence operation can potentially be a criminal offence attracting a sentence of up to ten years’ jail. The new offence raised particular concern following the disclosures from US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden, and appears in part directed at curbing future disclosures and subsequent reporting should another intelligence whistleblower emerge.

Since the legislation passed little has been heard about these operations. But the inspector general of intelligence and security’s annual report provides the first hint that a special intelligence operation may have been approved. As the IGIS is the oversight agent for Australia’s intelligence community, the report is likely to be the only way this information can be officially disclosed, with the exception of the parliamentary intelligence committee.

So has an operation been approved? Here’s what the inspector general’s report said:

“SIOs may be authorised for periods of up to 12 months. Asio is required to notify the IGIS when the attorney general approves an SIO, and must report to the attorney general and IGIS after six months and at the conclusion of the SIO.

“As this is a significant new power, we intend to review each SIO that is authorised by the attorney general. Asio has advised that there are security concerns with disclosing the exact number of SIOs. IGIS staff received relevant documents and attended relevant briefings, and did not identify any issues of legality or propriety.”

This paragraph makes Scott Morrison’s briefings about on-water matters look like the very model of directness. And it was probably designed to be that way.

One reading could be that no applications have been made, because it “intends” to review each SIO. But the fact the inspector general has received documents to consider “for issues of legality or propriety” suggests the oversight role conferred once an operation has been authorised could have been engaged.

Either interpretation may be true. But it’s not something a journalist would want to be wrong about.

Guardian Australia asked the inspector general’s office to clarify this statement, and it said: “The office of the inspector general of intelligence and security does not have anything to add to the statement in the annual report. Any more specific comment on the use of the powers is a matter for the relevant agency.”

The response from the shadowy “Asio media team” was: “Thank you for you inquiry, Asio does not comment on operational matters.”

The attorney general’s office has not responded to requests for comment about whether he has approved any special intelligence operations.

There are understandable limitations on what could be disclosed about a particular special intelligence operation. If one has been recently approved, it is probably still a live operation. Any particular details about it could jeopardise the operation.

But we’re not looking for details, just a general clarification that one has been approved. Asio has advised that there are “security concerns” about disclosing the exact number of these operations, but we have no way of knowing what the concerns are.

The justification for this level of secrecy is not entirely clear. It is possible that the reason for the inspector general’s vagueness reflects concern that the office itself may fall foul of the offence surrounding disclosures of the operations by confirming the existence of an operation.

There is some reason to doubt this is the case though – and also to dispute Asio’s assertion about the security risks of disclosing statistical information about SIOs. The disclosure offence has been modelled on an existing offence in the Crimes Act for “controlled operations” that are conducted by the Australian federal police. These operations are similarly sensitive, in that they will generally involve officers going undercover in some capacity, and they can be granted immunity from committing certain offences.

But despite the similarities, the commonwealth ombudsman has had no problems disclosing detailed information about these operations each year. There appear to be no problems with the ombudsman confirming the existence of controlled operations, despite the identical wording of the disclosure offence.

Some of these concerns have been flagged by the the independent national security legislation monitor, Roger Gyles QC, who has been conducting an inquiry into the scope and potential application of the disclosure offence under the Asio Act. But Gyles’s office has limited resources, and his report on the matter has yet to be finalised. His report will likely be critical in determining whether the government winds back the disclosure offence from the current sweeping gag clause.

So for the moment, you will just have to make up your own mind about whether a special intelligence operation has occurred. Because we can’t tell you and nobody else will.

There's no reporting on Asio operations when even the watchdog won't talk