Stephen Smith is perfectly entitled to hold, and to maintain, his opinion about the appropriateness of the response by the ADFA commandant, Bruce Kafer, to the Skype sex scandal. When Smith heard of what had happened to the girl, first at the hands of fellow cadets and then, as Smith understood it, from the ADFA system, he was angry and concerned, and he was expressing his opinion on the facts as then known to him. Honestly, and no doubt urgently, because the story was already in the public domain.

Smith's a politician. It is hard to criticise the boss for blowing his top over yet another case of appalling and boorish conduct by soldiers - in this case newly recruited would-be officers - or over what appeared (wrongly, as most, if not Smith, now think) to be an inept compounding of the sense of victimhood of the complainant by the people in charge. On ADF form, he cannot even be criticised for jumping to conclusions, even if he did. The really unfair thing, so far as Kafer is concerned, is that he was, and is, bound by military discipline and thus lacked the right to defend himself in public with the robustness of a Smith. If he had he would have been in trouble with his superiors, and even more trouble with Smith.

Smith has never held back in close political combat, and if he knows regret, there's no great evidence that he has ever known shame. He's of the (Ian) Sinclair (Lewis) school: never explain, never apologise. If I was in trouble, I would expect a fairer hearing from Kafer than Smith.

A lot of sympathy inevitably flows to Kafer. But those wanting to make judgments should understand that neither man has been operating in the same plane. And thank God for that, even as one then has to make some allowances.

Supporters of Kafer, for example, have not only criticised the woman for rushing to the media at all, but for rushing to it with a completely wrong idea of the actions Kafer had already put in train. But I bet Kafer wishes he had spent more time telling her what he would do. Had he done so, there might have been no blow-up at all, or a much more containable one.

However, Smith and predecessors for 15 years are entitled to a strong sense of grievance about being continually distracted from higher policy, strategy and logistics by sex and bullying scandals, pay and equipment stuff-ups and endemic problems of procurement, project management and multi-million-dollar weapon platforms that don't work, don't arrive, don't coordinate with other equipment. And by politically mischievous leaks.

In these matters, Smith, the government and Australians are being regularly let down by our senior military commanders and senior Defence bureaucrats. One simply cannot say that this is because they are distracted by operational requirements - such as soldiers under fire in Afghanistan. Nor is the mess for want of senior managers, or officers or bureaucrats, from Defence Secretary (former Major General) Duncan Lewis, down. Defence has about four times as many people with stars on their epaulets as Australia needed when we had a million men and women under arms in 1944. We have about 30 times as many senior bureaucratic managers as then. (Indeed, perhaps it is the obvious brass creep and oversupply that causes so many problems, and so often with so little accountability.)

The sex, booze, social media and internal culture issues - each subject of reports this week - are but subsets of the problem of any organisation - particularly one depending on the efforts of young men and women - in adapting to social change.

It's a problem not helped by the fact that the biggest cultural problem is not with those young men and women - by and large, an ordinary if somewhat fitter subset of their age and sex cohort. It is with the culture of those - mostly 25 or more years older, and almost entirely male - who lead the organisation. It is people of this generation (and not just in the services or the department) who do not really ''get'' what society wants and expects. It is this cohort - including the non-commissioned officers - whose own actions, over matters such as alcohol, sex, bullying and duty, are most often at obvious variance with their words. The very top brass may at last be ''getting'' it, if only from public kicks in the trousers. But they still have a long way to go in driving the message downwards.

One of this week's reviews, by Major General Craig Orme, makes it quite clear that there is no lack of detailed statements of principle, policy and procedure. Indeed, it suggests there might be too many for them to be readily understood.

The military has been described ''as a 'tight' culture in which shared identity, clear norms and role requirements, strong sanctions for deviations, and social stratification are exercised in a predominantly male culture [which] tends to create various manifestations of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

'' 'Insiders' are those who are socially dominant and conform to the cultural ideal, while 'outsiders' are those whose inclusion is perceived as posing cultural risks. 'Outsiders' are often cultural minorities, such as women [!], ethnic members or those with a non-mainstream sexual persuasion.

''The ADF's tendency in reacting to organisational failures and poor behaviour … has been essentially procedural, resulting in a table of recommendations each of which is then individually implemented over time. This, however, is not a reliable strategy for cultural change.''

Orme wants positive work on developing a new operations-focused culture - away from the ''them and us'' mentality. It needs, he says, ''four integral cultural building blocks:

■ A Just Culture: Where members understand the difference between good and bad behaviour and know what is expected of them, and believe they will get a fair go and be treated with respect.

■ An Inclusive Culture: Where all members are considered part of the team, regardless of their demographic features, and are regarded as important elements in contributing to mission success.

■ A Reporting Culture: Where poor performance of any type is identified then all ADF members understand their responsibility to report it, and can do so safely and without fear of recrimination.

■ A Learning Culture: Where members continually review and reflect on performance and change and adapt where necessary, and where the ADF builds its collective ability to learn as an institution, with appropriate processes to capture and implement learning outcomes, thus providing a platform for progressive improvements in organisational performance.''

But this involves much more than waving a wand, or a start with the next set of recruits. These will, after all, be under the command of the most conservative and resistant upholders of ''traditional'' boyo culture. That culture has instinctive support from many ex-servicemen and not a few officers known to have publicly sneered at the way the services are becoming so politically correct and new age these days.

Stephen Smith is only of moderate PC sensitivity. As a politician, he is of a culture radically different from the man in the RSL bar.

An active element in Defence does not like Smith, or the government, or even, the idea that higher policy and decisions about the defence of the nation is a matter for civilians. For them, any political action is ''interference'', unworthy, unprofessional; and possibly unconstitutional. Any want of deference to the profession of arms is seen as a threat to sound order and military discipline.

Smith, like other recent Labor and Liberal ministers, has to live with a regular array of minor mutinies, insubordinations, deliberate stuff-ups and leaks. That's apart from the strain of deaths in combat, the juggle for resources, and the effort to be on top of technical matters. At least some of the anger Smith showed at Kafer reflects scars he had already borne. That his treatment of Kafer brought reflex condemnation from familiar critics probably did not make him review his response.

Yet almost everyone agrees that Kafer is a goodie, whether as an officer, a manager of people, and of things, as a person sensitive to problems and pressures on young cadet officers.

Smith's instinct - that it was unfair on the victim of the Skype affair that proceedings against her for unconnected offences were not suspended - was not an unreasonable opinion, even if he might have deferred to the command and pastoral opinion of a man as experienced as Kafer. There's no right or wrong with opinions. No one died as a result of Smith having his own. If his attachment to them (and reluctance to allow the report to see the light of day) seem now bullying, vindictive and unworthy so far as it affected Kafer, that can yet be undone without having to burn Smith at the stake.

It's obvious that the reputational damage to Kafer is now undone. Bruce Kafer is entitled to think that he has been thoroughly vindicated and exonerated. The review, from what little we are allowed to know about it, appears to reinforce ordinary chain-of-command systems and procedures, and the essential fairness of what Kafer did.

Some of those crying for Smith's blood want the case to be an object lesson which will warn off future ministers from having strong views about the need for the services to get their act in order, or ever interfering in service disciplinary matters again. With or without Smith it would be a management and political catastrophe if that occurred, or were seen to have occurred. Our generals, our admirals and our vice marshals have yet to earn that trust, or even, at this stage of the nation's history, to prove that they are more on top of their job than the politicians are at theirs.

This War Can't Be Left To Generals